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JURISDICTION 
This Court does not have original appellate jurisdiction over this matter because it 
is an appeal from a district court's review of a land use decision by a municipality. 
(;w Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 1132-35 & 37, 70 P.3d 47 (finding the court 
of appeals does not have original jurisdiction to hear challenges to land use decisions by 
local government entities). This appeal should have been filed with the Utah Supreme 
~ 
Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-102(j), subject to transfer to this Court under Utah 
Code § 78A-3-102(4). Id. This matter and all briefing to date should be transferred to 
\I the Utah Supreme Court, as provided for in Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, for the Supreme Court to determine if it will retain jurisdiction or transfer 
jurisdiction to this Court. See Motion to Transfer to Utah Supreme Court, which was 
filed on August 12, 2016. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Was Salt Lake City's denial of CB S's application to relocate its already 
demolished billboard arbitrary, capricious or illegal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Courts presume a land use decision is valid and 
determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code 
§ 10-9a-801(3)(a). See also Carlsen v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Smithfield, 2012 UT 
\;9 
App 260, 1 4, 287 P.3d 440 (quoting Utah Code § 10-9a-801(3)(a)) ("In reviewing a 
municipality's land use decision, '[t]he courts shall ... presume that a decision ... is 
1.;., valid' and shall 'determine only whether or not the decision ... is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal."') A decision is illegal if it "violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the 
~ 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time the decision was made." Utah Code§ 10-9a-801(3)(d). See also Carlsen, 2012 UT 
App 260 , 4 ( quoting Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P .2d 602, 604 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995)) ("[d]etermination of whether such a decision 'is illegal depends on a 
proper interpretation and application of the law."'). This court reviews interpretations of 
relevant statutory provisions for correctness giving no deference to a lower tribunal. 
2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v. Thorgaard, 2015 UT 29,, 17, 345 P.3d 675. It also reviews 
interpretations of relevant ordinances for correctness, but some deference is given to the 
interpretation of the ordinance advanced by the agency. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98, ~ 28, 104 P.3d 1208. Thus, in determining whether the decision was illegal 
because it violated state law, this Court reviews the decision for correctness. In 
determining whether the decision was illegal because it violated provisions of Salt Lake 
City Code, this Court reviews the decision for correctness giving some deference to Salt 
Lake City's interpretation of its own ordinance. 
Administrative decisions are not arbitrary and capricious if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Carlsen, 2012 UT App. 260, ,r 4. See also Utah Code § 10-9a-
80 l (3)( c ). This Court is limited to the record before the decision making body and 
reviews that evidence to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the decision. Carlsen, 2012 UT App. 260, ,r 5. It is not the prerogative of this Court to 
weigh the evidence anew. Id. Rather, this Court must simply determine, in light of the 
evidence before the decision making body, whether a reasonable mind could reach the 
same conclusion as that body. Id. 
2 
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PRESERVATION: CBS appealed the denial of its application to Salt Lake City's 
appeal authority and then filed a petition with the district court claiming the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 0001-0746.) 
ISSUE: Was Salt Lake City's approval of Comer Property's application to 
relocate its billboard arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standards of review set forth above also apply to 
this issue. 
PRESERVATION: CBS appealed the approval of Comer Property's application 
"' to Salt Lake City's appeal authority and then filed a petition with the district court 
claiming the decision was arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 0001-0746.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code§ 10-9a-511(3)(c), Utah Code§ 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv), Utah Code § 10-
9a-701, Utah Code§ 10-9a-707, Salt Lake City Code§§ 21A.16.010-050, and Salt Lake 
City Code § 21 A.46.160. These provisions are set forth in the addendum to this brief as 
provided for in Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
To construct a billboard in Salt Lake City, a billboard company must obtain a 
permit from the City. See Salt Lake City Code§ 21.46.030. This case is about the City's 
decision I to grant one billboard company a permit and deny another billboard company a 
1 The Utah Municipal Code contemplates review of decisions made by a "land use 
authority." See e.g., Utah Code § 10-9a-703(1), Utah Code § 10-9a-704(1)-(2), Utah 
Code§ 10-9a-705, Utah Code§ 10-9a-707(1), (3) & (4), Utah Code§ 10-9a-801(1). In 
Salt Lake City, the "land use authority" may be the planning commission, the historic 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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permit. Specifically, Outfront Media, LLC, fka CBS Outdoor ("CBS") filed an 
application requesting a permit__!5Wtllow relocation of an al~~-~dy_~~~oli~~~ 
from 726 West South Temple to 738 West South Temple. (R. 0746, SLCC 000018-22; 
SLCC 001473.) Comer Property, LLC ("Comer Property") filed an application for 
permits to allow relocation of a billboard from 280 West 500 South to 726 West South 
Temple. (R. 0746, SLCC 001474-1526.) Salt Lake City's zoning ordinance precludes 
the City from issuing permits for relocation of either billboard. See Salt Lake City Code 
§ 2 lA.46.160.2 However, a provision of the Utah State Code allows (but does not 
require) a municipality to waive its zoning ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard 
that would otherwise be prohibited by a municipality's zoning ordinance. See Utah Code 
---------~----- - .. ---------------~--- -------- . ,. _______________ ---- - -- --- ---· 
§ 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i). Accordingly, CBS and Corner Property filed applications 
requesting permits under that provision of the Utah State Code. (R. 0746, SLCC 001473, 
SLCC 001474-1526.) 
'-
The City could not grant both applications because another provision of the Utah 
State Code sets forth minimum spacing requirements for billboards that face a freeway. 
See Utah Code § 72-7-505(3). CBS and Comer Property proposed relocation of 
billboards to front I-15 and the proposed locations placed the billboards well within that 
minimum spacing requirement. The Mayor elected to waive the provisions of Salt Lake 
- ~---------------
landmark comm1ss1on, the zoning administrator, or another member of the City's 
administration, depending on the land use decision at issue. In this case the "land use 
authority" was Mayor Becker and the Becker administration. Hereinafter, the term 
"City's decision" will refer to that body and the decision made by that body. 
2 A copy of Salt Lake City Code § 2 IA.46.160 is included in the Addendum 
hereto. 
4 
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City's zoning ordinance with respect to Corner Property's application and approved that 
---· -----
--•-- --- ------·----------
application and denied CBS's application. (R. 0746, SLCC 001542 SLCC 001544.) This 
----------------------decision was made because the Becker administration had a long standing goal of 
~ reducing the number of billboards in Salt Lake City and retiring billboards when the 
opportunity arose. (R. 0746, SLCC 01538, ~ 2; R. 472-74 (citing R. 0746, SLCC 
-------
001528-40, 1568-70, 1572-77, 1579-87, 1589-1622).) Granting Comer Property's 
application and denying CBS's application furthered this well-established goal because it 
reduced the total number of billboards in the City by one and removed a billboard from 
~ ti500 South, a critical "gateway" into the City. (R.0746, SLCC 01539, ~~ 6-7; R. 0746, 
SLCC 002234 (lines 1070-1150).) Approving CBS's application and denying Corner 
Property's application would not achieve that result - the total number of billboards in /, 
· 1 ge__ cCJJ--~ c;- B.s ~''-tJ-),1 
Salt Lake City would remain the same. See infra § III, B. L 6J. ~,s:>--::J_) _,d, _rJ 'f?Vy-~ ,:=-, ".:' 
'IJ C l--/1 , - , . --- ""1 J , .JJ✓J v< \ , r~..>.>1.Cj _i 
CBS appealed that decision to the City's appeal authority - a hearing officer - .,, ( .,,, / 
claiming the City's decisions violated provisions of the Utah Code. (R. 0746, SLCC 
000203-000216.) The City took the position that the hearing officer did not have 
jurisdiction to determine issues of state law and, thus, could not consider CBS's 
arguments that the City's decision violated state law. (R. 0746, SLCC 001404-1406; 
SLCC 002259-002260 (lines 494-517).) The hearing officer disagreed and issued an 
opinion affinning the City's decisions, which set forth the hearing officer's interpretation 
of provisions of the Utah Code and state law. (R. 0746, SLCC 001893-1903.) CBS then 
¼> filed a petition for judicial review with the district court, pursuant to Utah Code § 10-9a-
80 l, claiming the City's decisions were arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 0001-8.) 
5 
,./ 
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The district court rejected CBS's arguments that the City's decisions were illegal because 
they violated provisions of the Utah and Salt Lake City codes, finding the provisions 
CBS relied on were inapplicable or disagreeing with CBS's int~rpretation of those 
provisions. (R. 0550-68.) The district court also considered CBS's arguments that the 
I 
decisions were arbitrary and capricious and found that they were not because there was 
substantial evidence in tlie record to support the City's decisions. (R. 0550-68.) CBS 
brings this appeal seeking a determination from this Court that the City's decisions were 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Salt Lake City's Billboard Ordinance and the Billboard Banking System. 
r 
Section 21 A.46.160 of the Salt Lake City Code (the "Billboard Ordinance")3 
regulates the construction and demolition of billboards in Salt Lake City limits. The 
Billboard Ordinance states its. purpose is to "limit the maximum number of billboards in 
I 
Salt Lake City to no greater than the current number." Salt Lake City Code/ 
§ 2 IA.46. l 60(A). It further states that its purpose is to provide "reasonable processes 
/ 
and methods for the replacement or relocation of existing non-conforming billboards to 
areas of the city where they will have less negative impact on the goals and polices of the 
city which promote the enhancement of the city's gateways, views, vistas and related 
urban design elements of the city's master plans." Salt Lake City Code§ 21A.46.160(A). 
The "reasonable processes and methods" referenced is the "billboard banking" system 
3 See supra n.2. 
6 
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that is established by the Billboard Ordinance. See generally Salt Lake City Code 
§ 2 lA.46.160. 
Under the billboard banking system, if a billboard owner voluntarily demolishes a 
~ > billboard, the billboard owner may "bank" credits for that billboard in the billboard bank 
and use those credits to construct a new billboard in certain designated areas of the City 
where billboards are a permitted use. Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.46. l 60(E)-(I). The 
Billboard Ordinance limits construction of new billboards to construction under this 
system. Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(J). It also precludes construction of a new 
billboard within 600 feet of a road that is defined by the Billboard Ordinance as a 
"gateway." Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(N). 1-15 is defined by the Billboard 
Ordinance as a "gateway." Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(B)(3). The Billboard 
Ordinance requires a billboard company to obtain a pennit from the City to either 
demolish a billboard or to construct a new billboard. Salt Lake City Code § 
21A.46.160(D) & (L). 
B. CBS's First Application to Relocate its Billboard and the Demolition of its 
Billboard. 
In October 2014, CBS owned a billboard that was located at approximately 726 
West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 0746, SLCC 001438-42.) The billboard 
(.:J) was located on land owned by Comer Property. (R. 0746, SLCC 001860-70.) The lease 
was set to expire on September 1, 2014. (R. 0746, SLCC 001860-70.) On October 20, 
2014, CBS submitted an application to the City for a permit that would allow it to move 
the billboard from 726 West South Temple to 738 West South Temple and to raise the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
height of the billboard from its current height of 86 feet to 116 feet. (R. 07 46, SLCC 
000018-22.) CBS submitted that application pursuant to Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 
because several provisions of the Salt Lake City Code governing construction or 
relocation of billboards preclude the relocation requested. (R. 0746, SLCC 000018-22.) 
. . 
Shortly after filing that application t9 relocate, CBS demolished the billboard at 
726 West South Temple becaus~ CBS's land lease had expired and the landowner;_ 
Comer Property, had provided CBS .notice to vacate the property. (R. 0746, SLCC 
001860-70; SLCC 002217 (lines 553-557}.) On December 4, 2014, the City denied 
CBS's application because Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 does not allow a billboard owner to 
both relocate and raise the height of a billboard. (R. 0746, SLCC 001444-52.) CBS' 
attempted to appeal the decision to a City hearing officer, but the City informed CBS that 
its hearing officers do not have jurisdiction to interpret issues of state law. (R. 0746, 
' 1 
/ 
SLCC 0014 70-71.) On January 2, 2015, CBS filed a petition for judicial review claiming 
I 
that it had the right under Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 to relocate and raise the height of the 
billboard. (R. 0453, , 17 citing Outfront Media f/k/a/ CBS Outdoor v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., Case No. 150900004.) At the same time CBS sought and obtained a preliminary 
injunction precluding the City from processing any other application for construction of a 
billboard at the 738 West South Temple location or any location within 500 feet. (R. 
0453, 'il 18.) On August 18, 2015, the court affirmed the City's denial of CBS's 
application finding Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 does not give a billboard owner the right to 
-
both move and raise the height of a billboard that otherwise qualifies for relocation under 
that statute. (R. 0453-54, 'il 19.) 
8 
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C. CBS's Amended Application to Relocate its 8illboard ·and Corner Property's 
Application to Relocate its 500 South Billboard. 
Approximately one month later, CBS modified its application to request relocation 
· of its demolished billboard under Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i). (R. 0746, SLCC 
'\,, 
. '"" 00·1473.\ During the same period of time, the C~y was processing an application from 
Corner Property to demplish a billboard located at 2-80 ~est 500 South and relocate that 
' \iii billboard to 726 West South Temple, where the_ CBS ~illboard was previously located. 
(R. 0746, SLCC 001474-1526.) Corner Property's application was also made pursuant to 
7 
Utah Code§ 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i). 
D. The City's Decisions. 
Both CBS and Comer Property's applications are precluded by provisions of Salt 
-
Lake City's zoning ordinance. See e.g., Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(N). Utah ~ 
Code § 10-9a-511 (3 )( c )(i) provides a municipality the discretion to waive its zoning 
ordinance and approve an application to relocate a billboard where its zoning ordinance 
would otherwise preclude the application. Mayor Becker considered both applications. 
He could not approve both requests because a provision of the Utah State Code (which 
the City cannot waive) states billboards adjacent to interstate highways may not be within 
500 feet of each other. Utah Code § 72-7-505(3). The requested relocations (if granted) 
v1' would place two billboards adjacent to 1-15 well within that 500 feet restriction. (R. 
0746, SLCC 01539, ,r,r 3-5. See also R.0746, SLCC 001473-1526.) Thus, consiste~t 
\ 
with the City's goal of reducing the total number of billboards in the City, the Mayor 
......_ 
authorized the denial of CBS's application and the approval of Corner Property's 
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application. (R. 0746, SLCC 001538-001542.) This decision was made because it would 
result in the net reduction of total billboards within the City and the removal of a 
billboard from 500 South. (R. 0746, SLCC 001539, 116-7.) 
On November 25, 2015, the City sent C!3S a letter stating it was denying CBS's 
application pursuant to its "longstanding policy in favor of retiring and removing 
billboards as the opportunity to do so arises." (R. 0746, SLCC 001542) The same day, 
the City sent Comer Property notification stating the City was approving its request to 
relocate its 500 South billboard to 726 West South Temple. (R. 0746, SLCC 001544.) 
The City and Comer Property executed a Billboard Relocation Agreement memorializing 
the terms by which Comer Property was allowed to relocate the 500 South billboard. (R. 
0746, SLCC 001546-48). 
E. CBS's Appeal of the City's Decisions. 
CBS pursued an appeal before the City's appeal authority - a hearing officer -
claiming the City's denial of its application and the approval of Co~~er Property's 
application were contrary to provisions of the Utah Code and arbitrary and capricious. 
(R. 0746, SLCC 000203-000216.) The City argued to the hearing officer that he did not 
have jurisdiction to consider CB S's arguments that the City's decisions were contrary to 
provisions of state law and that he must limit his decisions to determining if the City's 
decision violated the City's zoning ordinance. (R. 0746, SLCC 001404-1406; SLCC 
002259.:.002260 (lines 494-517).) On January 15, 2016, the hearing officer issued an 
opinion affirming the City's decisions, whiQh decision included the hearing officer's 
interpretation of state law. (R. 0746, SLCC 001893-1903.) CBS appealed that decision 
10 \. 
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r:,,\. .. 
to the district court. (R. 550-568.) The district court found the City's hearing officer did 
, not have jurisdiction to decide issues of state law, gave no deference to the hearing 
"- . 
officer's· ruling on those issues, and found the City's decisions were not arbitrary, 
• <. A._ -
(:d) papri~ious, or illegal. (R. 550-568.) CBS ~pe~ls that decision to this Court. 
'/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CBS asks this Court to review two City decisions: (1) the Mayor's decision to 
deny CBS's section 511 application to relocate its demolished 726 West South Temple 
billboard, and (2) the Mayor's decision to approve Comer Property's section 511 
(.ti) application to relocate its 500 South billboard. The decisions are not arbitrary, capricious 
or illegal and should be upheld. 
-
With respect to the first City decision, the denial of CBS's application was not 
illegal. The Mayor, as the City's chief administrator, has authority· to make 
administrative decisions on behalf of the City and the grant or denial of an application for 
billboard permits maee under section 511 of the Utah Munic.ipal Code, Utah Code § 10-
9a-5 l 1, is an administrative decision. · 
CBS contends the City Council 1'5 required to approve the Mayor's decision 
because a provision of the Eminent Domain Statute, Utah Code § 78B-6-501 et. seq., 
requires the City Council to approve the exercise of th~ powers of eminent domain 
conferred by that statute. That provision does not apply because the City is not 
exercising a power of eminent domain under the Eminent Domain Statute and the 
. . 
Vi prgyisions of that statute do not apply to the denial of an application for a billboard 
permit made pursuant to section 511 of the Utah Municipal Code. 
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Specifically, sections 511 and 513 are contained in the Uta~ Municipal Code and 
set forth the statutory scheme that governs the applications at issue in this case. Those 
\ , 
provisions do _not state that the statutory scheme created by sections 511 and 513 
incorporate the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation process set forth in ~that 
statute. . Legislative history also demonstrates that it was not the intent of the legislature 
to incorporate the Eminent D_omain Statute and the condemnation process set forth in that 
statute into the section 511 statutory scheme. Reading sections 511 and 513 as 
incorporating the requirements of the Eminent Domain Statute and its condemnation 
process is also absurd because it would impose the process in a regulatory taking action 
where the process is completely inapplicable and difficult, if not impossible, to complete. 
It would also enable billboard companies to prevent a municipality from denying a 
section 511 application, an absurd result where the plain language of the statute gives 
municipalities that choice. 
The Court should also reject CBS's alternative argument that the City's denial of 
its application is illegal because section 21A.46.160CC of the Salt Lake City Code 
precludes the City from denying applications to relocate billboards where just 
compensation is owed for the denial. Interpreting section 21A.46. l 60CC as CBS 
suggests reads section 21A.46. l 60CC in conflict with the plain language of section 511. 
Where state and city code conflict, state code prevails. Moreover, the plain language and 
legislative history of section 21A.46.160CC do not support CBS's interpretation of that 
provision and the City has never interpreted that provision as precluding the City from 
making such denials. 
12 
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Likewise, the denial of CBS 's application is not arbitrary and capricious because it 
furthered the City's goal of reducing the total number of billboards in the Salt Lake City 
limits. CB S's claim that the City_..has no policy, goal or objective of reducing billboards 
' / 
in the City limits lacks merit because the record is replete with examples of that goal of 
the Becker administration and a policy, objective or goal of 'an administration does not 
. \ 
need to be passed by the City Council to be valid, as CBS contenos. 
With respect to the second City decision, the approval of Comer Property's 
application is not illegal because section 511 allows the City to waive its ordinances to 
~ permit that relocation. Likewise, the decision is not arbitrary__and capricious because 
I 
denying CBS's application and approving Comer Property's application furthered the 
City's goal of reducing the total number of billboards in the City limits and removed a 
billboarg from 500 South, a critical gateway to the City. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE DECISIONS SUBJECT TO 
THAT REVIEW. 
A. The Applicable Standard of Review. 
When reviewing administrative decisions a court must "presume that a decision .. 
. made under the authority of [Title 10, Chapter 9a] is valid; and ... determine only 
whether or not the decision ... is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code § 10-9a-
801(3)(a)(i)-(ii). A decision is illegal if "the decision ... violates a law, statute, or 
I 
ordinance in effect atthe time the decision was made .... " Utah Code § 10-9a-801 (3 )( d). 
A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision- is not supported by substantial 
' 
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evidence in the record. Carlsen v. Ed. of Adjustment of City of Smithfield, 2012 UT App 
, 260, ,r 4, 287 P .3d 440. 
B. The Decisions Subject to Review by this Court. 
CBS incorrectly identifies the hearing officer's ruling, not the Mayor's decisions, 
as· the administrative decision at issue and the, subject of 1review in this case. ' 
. 
Municipalities are charged by statute with the responsibility of establishing an appeal 
authority to "hear and decide ... appeals from decisions applying, the [municipality's] 
land use ordinances." Utah Code § 10-9a-701(1)(b). In the vast majority of cases, an 
appeal authority is charged with nothing more than determining whether the land use 
authority's decision violates a law, statute or ordinance or was not supported by 
substantial evidence. 4 As such, the appeal authority performs the same review as a 
district court in a petition for judicial review or an appellate court on an appeal from that 
decision and its ruling is no more the administrative decision at issue than the ruling of 
the district court or a ruling of this Court. In some circumstances an appeal authority 
may f.ctually hear testimony, weigh evidence, and is charged with remaking the 
4 See e.g., Utah Code § 10-9a-701(3)(a)(i)-(ii) (stating an appeal authority acts in 
a "quasi-judicial manner" and "serve[s] as the final arbiter of issues involving the 
interpretation or application of land use ordinances"); Utah Code § 10-9a-707(3) 
( directing appeal authorities to "determine the correctness of a decision of the land use 
authority in its interpretation and application of a land use ordinance."); Salt Lake City 
Code§ 21A.16.030(E) ("[a]n appeal from a decision of the historic landmark commission 
or planning commission shall be based on the record made below ... [t]he appeals 
hearing officer shall uphold the decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence 
in the record or it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect when the decision was 
made.") 
14 
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administrative decision.5 Only in those rare circumstances is the appeal authority's ruling 
the administrative decision that is the subject of review. 
The hearing officer's ruling is not the administrative decision at issue in this case 
~ fq.r, two reasons. One, the hearing officer did not have authority to issue a ruling on the 
--
issues raised in the administrative appeal. Two, the hearing officer's review was 
appellate in nature. A hearing officer's authority is specifically limited to considering a 
- I11unicipality' s I application of its land use ordinance. See Utah Cqde § 10-9a-707( 4) 
("/ojnly those decisions i11 which a la11d use authority has applied a la11d use ordinance 
~ to a particular application, person, or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority.") 
( emphasis added); Utah Code § 10-9a-703( 1) (limiting appeals to an appeal authority to 
claims "that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by 
the land use authority in the administration or interpretation of the land use 
ordinance."); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.16.0 IO ("'the appeals hearing officer shall hear 
and decide appeals alleging an error in any administrative decision made by the zoning 
administrator or the administrative hearing officer in the administration or enforcement 
of this title, as well as administrative decisions of the historic landmark commission; and 
the planning commission.") ( emphasis added). CBS' s administrative appeal asked the 
hearing officer to interpret the language of Utah Code § 10-9a-51 I (3 )( c) and find the 
5 See e.g., Utah Code § I 0-9a-707( 1 )-(2) (stating that factual matters are reviewed 
under the standard set by municipal ordinance and where no standard is set the appeal 
authority reviews the matter de novo ); Salt Lake City Code § 21 A.46.030(E)( 1) ("[t]he 
standard of review for an appeal, other than as provided in subsection E2 of this section, 
shall be de novo. The appeals hearing officer shall review the matter appealed anew, 
based upon applicable procedures and standards for appr_oval, and shall give no deference 
to the decision below.") 
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Mayor's decisions wer~ not permitted by that and other provisions of the Utah Code. As 
the City argued to the hearing officer, a hearing officer is not an Article III judge and a 
- -~ 
district court, not a City hearing officer, must make the determinations CBS requested in, 
its administrative appeal.6 (R. 0746, SLCC 001404-1406; SLCC 002259-002260 (lines 
494-517).) Despite the City's arguments, the hearing officer issued a ruling approving 
the Mayor's decisions and setting forth his interpretation of section 511 and the 
applicability of the Eminent Domain Statute to that provision.7 (R. 0746, SLCC 001893-
1903.) 
Second,\. the hearing officer's review although designated as de novo was 
appropriately appellate in nature. 8 De novo review literally means "anew, afresh, a 
second time." Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1981) (internal quotations 
r 
omitted). "De novo" may mean a complete retrial upon new evidence or a trial upon the 
record made before the lower tribunal. Id. at 416. The meaning of "~e novo" is "dic~ated 
by the wording and context of the statute in which it appears and by the nature of the 
administrative body, decision and procedure being reviewed.~ Id. at 416-17. A de novo 
review of a decision made pursuant to statutory authority granting the decision-maker 
6 Notably, the issues CBS asked the hearing officer to rule on are also issues of 
first impression under Utah law. 
7 A hearing officer has authority to interpret municipal land use ordinances, but 
the hearing officer did not reach a conclusion on the meaning of section 21A.46.160(CC) 
of the Salt Lake City Code because the hearing officer determined that state law 
"trumped" City ordinance and the state law permitted the City to waive that ordinance. 
(R. 0746, SLCC 001896-98.) 
8 The hearing officer found he was required to conduct a de novo review in this 
case because the decision was not an appeal from a decision of the historic landmark , 
commission or the planning commission. (R. 01984-95.) See also Salt Lake City Code § 
21A.16.030(E), included in the Addendum. 
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( 
discretion requtres the court to determine if the statute provided the decision maker 
I 
,authority to make the decision and whether the decision made exceeds the bounds of 
• I 
reasonableness. See e.g., Hogs R Us v. Town o(Fairfield, 2009 UT 21,207 P.3d 1221. 
For example, in Hogs R Us, 2009 UT 21, ,I,I 2-6, the Utah Supreme Court was 
charged with determining whether the law required the Town of Fairfield to maintain a 
road the plaintiffs used to access their land under a de nova standard of review. 
Recognizing it is not the role of a court to substitute its decision for that of an elected 
official where a statute confers authority for the decision on the electeq official, the 
;,;;jJ court's de no.vo _revie\V consisted of a determination that the applicable statute gave the 
, 
town complete discretion to decide how to improve roads and the common faw did not 1 
otherwise impose a duty to maintain roads. Id., ii~ 15-23. 
To the extent the hearing officer had any authority to review the Mayor's 
decisions in thi~ case he appropriately limited his de novo review to a determination of 
r 
~he~~~r the statute afforded the Mayor discretion to make the decisions and whether the 
decisions exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. 9 As such, the hearing officer's ruling 
9
· CBS argued the hearing officer's de novo review should extend to the hearing 
officer stepping into the shoes of the Mayor and substituting his decision for that of the 
Mayor. The hearing officer initially ruled that he believed his de novo review extended 
to considering matters of City policy and substituting his decision for that of the Mayor, 
if he felt it was appropriate. (R. 0746, SLCC 002225 (lines 793-813); SLCC 001398 
('The review is not limited to the facts and law but also to policy considerations which 
fall within the discretion of the City to consider in making the original decisions.").) The 
City assisted the hearing officer in understanding that his role, as a quasi-judicial officer, 
was to consider whether the decisions made were permitted by law, not to substitute his 
decision for that of the Mayor where the decision involves pure policy considerations. 
(R. 0746, SLCC 001405-06.) In his final decision, the hearing officer agreed witft the 
City's position and appropriately limited his de novo review to a determination of 
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is appellate in nature and is essentially the same in scope as the review conducted by the 
district court and the review that will be conducted by this Court. (R. 07 46, SLCC 
01894-95.) The Mayor's decisions, not the hearing officer's review of those decisions, 
are the administrative decisions subject to review in this appeal. 
II. THE CITY'S DENIAL OF CBS'S APPLICATION TO RELOCATE A 
DEMOLISHED BILLBOARD WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR 
ILLEGAL. 
The City's denial of CBS's section 511 application requesting the City waive its 
zoning ordinance and allow CBS to relocate its demolished billboard was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal because ( 1) the Mayor can make a decision to deny a section 511 
application; (2) section 21 A.46.160(CC) of the Salt Lake City Code does not prevent the 
Mayor from making that decision, and (3) the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
A. The Mayor can make a Decision to Deny a Section 511 Application. 
. 1. Waiving or not Waiving an Ordinance is an Administrative 
Decision. 
Granting or denying an application brought under section 511 is an administrative 
decision that the Mayor has authority to make. Section 511 (3 )( c )(i) allows a municipality 
to waive ( or not waive) its zoning ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard that is 
o~herwise prohibited. Utah Code § 10-9a-51 l (3)(c)(i). The subsection sets forth no 
factors or guidelines stating any circumstance under which a municipality must waive its 
whether the statute afforded the Mayor authority to make the decisions and whether the 
decisions exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. (R. 0746, SLCC 001894-95.) 
18 
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/ 
;ordinance, but rather contemplates a negotiation between the parties and an agreement to 
a ':mutually acceptable location." Id. Thus, the decision to waive ( or not waive) 
_ ordinances and permit relocation of billboards is left to the discretion of the municipality. 
The Mayor, as Salt Lake City's chief administrative officer, has the authority to 
, exercise that discretion on behalf of the City. It is well established that in a council-
mayor form of government the council is responsible for the passage of la~vs and the 
mayor, and the administration are responsible for the enf<?rcement of those laws. Scherbel 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) (quoting Martindale v. Anderson, 
'@ 581 P .2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978) C" [l]egislative power, as distinguished from executive 
power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce th~m or appoint the agents 
charged with the duty to make such enforcement. The latter are executive functions."'). 
A decision to waive ( or not waive) ordinances falls clearly within the powers afforded the 
'@ 
administration because it is a decision to '"enforce" or not to "enforce" provisions of 
zoning ordinances. A decision under section 51 I falls squarely within the realm of the 
executive branch and it was appropriate for the Mayor to make the decision that the City 
was _!10t going to waive its ordinances and deny CBS 's request to relocate its already 
demolished billboard. 
2. Approval of the City Council is not Required when a Municipality 
Denies a Section 511 Application. 
CBS claims the City's denial of its application is illegal because the City Council 
" must approve that denial. CB S's argument relies on a provision of the Eminent Domain 
Statute~ Utah Code § 78B-6-50 I et. seq., that requires approval from the City Council 
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\ 
when the City exercises the powers of eminent domain conferred by that statute. That ' 
provision does not apply because the City is not exe~cising a power of eminent domain 
,,. under that. statute and the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute do no~ apply to 
decisions to deny applications for billboard pennits made pursuant to section 511. 
i. Section 511 and section 513 do not incorporate the Eminent 
Domain Statute and its condemnation process. 
Sections 511 and 513 are contained in the Utah Municipal Code and set forth the · 
statutory scheme that· governs .the application at issue in this case. They do not state that 1 
the scheme incorporates the condemnation process set forth in the Eminent Domain 1 · 
Statute .. · See Utah Code §§ 10-9a-511 & 513. "When interpreting a statute, [ a court 
should] look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms." Anadarko Petroleum 
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2015 UT 25, ~ 11, 345 P.3d 648. HWhen language is 
clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction." Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (quoting Salt 
Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P .2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) 
( quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P. 3 77, 3 80 (1921 )). Likewise, "'where two statutes 
t~eat the same subject matter, and one statute is general while the other is specific, the 
. spedfic provision controls." Floyd v. W. Surgical Associates, Inc., 773 P .2d 401, 404 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Sections 511 and 513 set forth the statutory scheme that governs the application at 
issue in this case. Section 511 (3 )( c )(i) states a municipality "may" waive its zoning 
ordinance to "permit a billboard owner to relocate the billboard within the municipality's 
20 
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boundaries to a location that is mutually acceptable to the municipality and the billboard 
owner." Utah Code §10-9a-51 l (3)(c)(i). Secti-on 511(3)(c)(ii) states that if the parties 
. . , 
-
• - I 
cannot ·reach a mutually agreeable location within ninety days of hie subm'is~on of the . 
. '\.' ,- ':' 
-
application the provisions of section 513(2)(a)(iv) apply. Utah Code. § 10-9a-
,_ 
511(3)(c)(ii) .. section 513(2)(a)(iv)_states that a municipality is "considered to have 
-ifiitiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent domain if the municipality 
prevents a billboard owner from . . . relocating a billboard into any commercial, 
industrial, or manufacturing zone ... ~- if the requested relocation is within one mile of the 
vi original location and meets other distance· requirements. Utah _ Code § 10-9a-
5 l 3(2)( a)(iv ). Section 513(2)(d) sets forth the 'just compensation" that is owed when a 
municipality is '"considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard." Utah Code 
§ 10-9a-513(2)( d). This scheme essentially authorizes a municipality to waive its 
ordinances to allow relocation of a billboard and finds that in some circumstances just 
compensation is owed if a municipality declines to waive its ordinance and allow 
relocation. 
No provision of section 511 or section 51} references the general Eminent Domain· 
Statute 01: states that the provisions of that statute apply when a City denies a section 5 ll 
\ 
application, a point CBS concedes. (Appellant Br. 20 & 23 .) Courts must "seek to give 
effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all orriissipns to be purposeful." 
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P 's~ip, 2011 UT 50, ,r 14, 267 P.3d 863. The 
legislature had the means to incorporate the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute by 
reference, if that was its intent. Its failure to do so must be understood as purposeful. 
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'· 
CBS's assertion that incorporation of the Eminent Domain Statute should be assumed 
because sections 511 and 513 do not specifically exclude that statute is contrary to this · I.J 
well established principle. 
ii. 
\ 
\ . 
I I 
Legislative history demonstrates sections 511 and S 13 do not 
incorporate the Eminent · Domain Statute and it.r' ~ 
condemnation process. 
Legislative h}story also demonstrates that it was not the intent of the legislature to 
- - . 
, "\ 
incorporate the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation process 
set forth in that statute into the statutory scheme set forth in sections 511 and . 513. 
"When examining a statute, [courts] look first to its plain language as the best indicator of 
the legislature's intenJ and purpose in passing the statute." Wilson v. Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998). "[I]f that language is ambiguous [courts] turn to 
a consideration of legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Id. 
CBS claims that the language of section 513 shows the legislature intended section 
513 to incorporate the provisions of the Eminent D9mait?- Statute because it states "[a] 
municipality is considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by 
eminent domain" if the municipality. preveqts a billboard owner from relocating a 
billboard within parameters defined by that section. (Appellant Br. 16~ 17 & 19-20 ( citing 
Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)(a).) But legislative history demonstrates the opposite. In 
20 I 0, a bill was proposed to modify the language of section 513 to require a municipality 
to "initiate eminent domain proceedings in the district court" if it prevented the 
modifications or a relocation within the parameters identified in section 513. (R. 0209-
22 
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224, H.B. 180, 2010 Leg., Gen Sess. (Utah 2010).) The bill did not pass. By not passing 
this bill, the legislature made clear the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute and the 
- ,'" . 
\ - -
process set forth in that statute did not apply to the process of paying just compensationi "'-
. I \ I ' . 
' + • • I , \' 
for t~e denial of a billbo~rd -·felocation Pyrmit, even if the denial gives rise to an 
: ' l, ., .. ' 
·' 
obligation to pay just corripensation. 
,_,, _,,.,., 
iii. 
. - j 
, , r ' 
Sections 511 and 513 do not incorporate the Eminent 
Domain Statute and its condemnation process because the 
' \ . 
stqtutes are not in pari materia . 
The Court rllay reject CBS's claim that sections 511 and 513 should be read as 
incorporating the terms of the Eminent Domain Statute for the additional reason that the 
statutes are not in pari materia. Statutes are only construed together when they are in 
~ pari materia. J.J. W. v. State, Div. of Child & Family Servs., 2001 UT App 271, ,r,r 21-23, 
33 P.3d 59 (stating the "[s]tatute[s] are not in pari materia and we will not construe them 
together.) Statutes are in pari materia _'\v.hen they relate to the same person or thing, to 
-- . 
the same class of persons or" things, or have the same purpose or object." Id., ,r 22 
,/ - - / ' 
(quoting Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985)). 
-. ,,,_ ' 
In JJ W the State argued, simHar to the argument made by CBS in this case, that 
the Juvenile Expungement Statute should be interpreted the same as the Criminal 
Expungement Statute and that the definition of "expungement" used in the Criminal 
Expungement Statute should also apply to the Juvenile Expungement Statute. Id., ,r 21. 
The court declined to impute the definition of one statute to the other because the statutes 
were not in pari materia. Id., ,r 23. In reaching the conclusion that the statutes were not 
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in pari materia the court found the statutes did not relate to the same p~rson or class of,,, 
persons because one statute "deals with records generated in connection with juvenile 
delinquency proceedings" whereas, the other statute "deals with adult criminal records." 
Id. It also {ound that the statutes did not have the same purpose hecause the Juvenile 
Expungement Statute is broader than the Criminal Expungement Statute, permitting 
expungement of a wider category of documents. Id. 
This case presents a much clearer example of statutes'111.at are not in pari materia. 
The statutory scheme established by sections 511 and 513 do not relate to the same 
person or class of persons and do not have the same purpose as the Eminent Domain 
Statute. Section 511 sets forth a process for a municipality and a billboard owner to 
attempt to agree on relocation of a billboard and section 513 imposes an obligation to pay 
just compensation in some circumstances, if agreement is not reached. The Eminent 
Domain Statute sets forth the circumstances under which a government entity may take 
title to property and use that property for a public use and sets forth the process a 
government entity must follow when it exercises that power of eminent domain. Sections 
511 and 513 and the Eminent Domain Statute are not in pari materia and the Court 
should not apply the process contained in the Eminent Domain Statute to sections 511 
and 513. 
24 
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\ 
-, 
iv. Section 511 and 513 tw-nfJJ incorporate the Eminent Domain 
'7 
Statute and its condemnation process 'because it is absurd to 
impose that process in a regulatory taking action. 
Reading sections 511 and 513 as incorporating the requirements of the Eminent 
Domain Statute and its condemnation process is also absurd because sections 511 and 
513 set forth a circumstance in which a regulatory taking occurs. See £neon Utah, LLC 
v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ,r 73, 210 P.3d 263, 276 (quoting State ex rel. 
Z. C., 2007 UT 54, ~ 15, n.5, 165 P .3d 1206 ("'[ when] statutory language plausibly 
presents the court with t\vo alternative readings,"' a court should adopt "the reading that 
avoids absurd results.")). The statutory scheme established by sections 511 and 513 is a 
$.l_atutory determination that a regulatory taking occurs, in some circumstances, when a 
\dU municipality declines to waive its ordinance and permit relocation of a billboard. A 
\ 
regulatory taking occurs at common law when the denial of an application for a permit or 
the passage of an ordinance deprives a property owner of "all reasonable [ or 
economically viable] uses of his land." Tolman v. Logan City, 2007 UT App 260, ,r 11, 
167 P.3d 489 (quoting Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991).) If a 
4-@ property owner can make that showing the owner may receive just compensation for the 
./ 
taking. See e.g., Nat'! Parks & Conservation Ass 'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 
925 (Utah 1993) (overruled on other grounds) ("'The state ... need compensate a 
landowner only if the regulation deprives him or her of all economically viable use of the 
land .... "). 
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Section 513 removes the requirement that a billboard owner show a taking of all 
economically viable use of a billboard to establish a regulatory taking when a City 
declines to waive its ordinances and permit relocation of a billboard under section 511. 
Instead, to establish a taking the billboard owner must show its application satisfies the 
\ I 
circumstances listed i~ section\ 513 that give, rise to an obligation to pay just 
compensation. Like any other decision t~at g~ves rise to a claim that a regulatory taking 
• has occurred, the ~1]nent Domain Statute does not apply and a municipality is not ~ ' 
required to follow the condemnation process set forth in that statute, including obtaining 
---
approval of the City Council before making a decision to deny a permit. 
The provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute are also wholly inapplicable to a 
regulatory taking type action. For example, section 504 of the general Eminent Domain 
Statute provides a municipality must show that the property taken "is to be applied [to] a 
use authorized by law," the taking is "necessary for the use," and the "construction and 
use of all property sought to be condemned will commence within a reasonable time ... 
after the initiation of proceedings." Utah Code § 7 8B-6-504( a)-( c ). This requirement. is 
completely inapplicable to the denial of an application to relocate a billboard under 
section 511 of the Utah Municipal Code because a municipality does not take ow_nership 
j 
I 
of the billboard and it is not commencing any "construction" or "public use" of any 
property. 
Section 504 also requires written notice be provided to the property owner and that 
the prop~rty owner be provided an opportunity to be heard before a final vote is taken by 
the political subdivision to take the property at issue. Utah Code§ 78B-6-504(2)(b)-(d) . 
26 
® 
I ® 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is completely illogical to require a municipality to provide written notice that it is going 
to deny an application to relocate before doing so. Likewise, it makes no sense to require 
a municipality to provide a billboard owner notice and a right_ to be heard before denying 
~ an application to relocate where the billboard owner is clearly on notice of the process 
, I i 
because it filed an application to relocate and initiated Jhe, relocation process. It is absurd 
' . . J 
\ ~ 
to~ impose the requirement of the Eminent Domain Statute on this regulatory taking action 
and the Court should decline to do so. 
v. Section 511 and 513 do not inc01porate the Eminent Domain 
Statute and its condemnation process because it would allow 
a billboard owner to prevent a municipality from denying a 
section 511 application. 
Imposing the requirement of the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation 
process set forth in that statute gives rise to the additional absurd result that a billboard 
owner can prevent a municipality from ever deny__ing an application to relocate under 
section 511, despite the fact the statute provides municipalities that choice. The 
con~·emnation_ l??ce~s set forth in the Eminent Domain Statute and the· Utah Relocation 
Assistance ~ct requires a condemning party to prepare an appraisal and negotiate in good 
, / - I 
faith with the propetty owner- for the purchase of the property before condemning the 
property. See Utah Code § 78B-6-504(2)(b) (stating "[p]roperty may not be taken by a 
political subdivision of the state unless the governing body of the political subdivision 
approves the taking"); Utah Code § 78B-6-505(1 )(a) (stating that before a political 
subdivision takes a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, the 
"governing body ... make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for 
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-the purchase of the property."); Utah Code"§ 57-12-13(2) (requiring "[r]eal property shall 
\ I 
be appraised 4Jefore the initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his designated 
represent~tive shall be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his 
inspection of the property."); Utah Code § 57-12-13(3) (stating with respect to the 
amount offered in negotiations that "[i]n no event shall such amount be less than the 
lowest approved appraisal of the fair market value of the property."). CBS argues these 
provisions also apply to the denial of a section 511 application. (Appellant Br. 23, n. l .) 
Unlike a parcel of real property, an appraiser cannot value a billboard based on its 
size, geographic setting and comparable properties. Rather, Utah statute directs that a 
billboard is valued like a business, based on the actual annual revenue generated by the 
particular billboard at issue. Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)( d)(i) ( directing that "just 
compensation" for a billboard is calculated using "a fair market capitalization rate, based 
on actual annual revenue, less any annual rent expense"). If a billboard owner refuses to 
provide records showing the revenue generated by the billboard at issue, as billboard 
companies generally do when filing an application to relocate with the City, a 
municipality cannot prepare an appraisal and value the billboard as directed by Utah 
Code § 10-9a-513(2)( d)(i) before denying an application to relocate. This issue 1s 
extensively briefed in a matter currently pending before this Court. 10 
/ 
10 In that case, Reagan Outdoor Advertising ("Reagan") filed an application to 
relocate a billboard under a different provision of the Utah .State Code. See Appellant 
Br., 5-6 (§ A Statement of Facts) Salt Lake City v. ROA General Inc. dba Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Appellate No. 2015-0608-CA. At the time the appl_ication was 
filed, the land lease was set to expire and the landowner had represented it would not 
renew the lease: Id., 7-8 (§ D Statement of Facts). The City denied the application, 
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Notably, CBS argued to the hearing officer and to the district court that the City's 
decision was illegal because the Eminent Domain Statute and condemnation process 
requires the City to file a Complaint in condemnation. CBS does not expressly raise Jhat 
~ argument in this briefing, perhaps because it makes the absurdities of imposing the 
requirements of the Eminent Domain Statute and the condemnation process so apparent. 
\ 
vi. Section 512 does not show sections 511 and 513 incorporate 
the Eminent Domain Statute and the Condemnation Process. 
The Court may also reject CBS's argument that the Eminent Domain Statute 
\ 
applies because section 512 o( the Municipal Code provides that "a municipality may 
only require termination of a billboard ... by (a) gift; (b) purchase; (c) agreement; (d) 
exchange; or (e) eminent domain." Utah Code § 10-9a-512. The City did not require 
}\l}J_ich came with a statutory obligation to pay just compensation. Id. 7-8 (§ D Statement 
of Facts). The City attempted to obtain financial inforrrultion from Reagan to prepare an 
appraisal and pay the just compensation owed. Id. 6-7 (§ B Statement of Facts). Reagan 
refused to provide the infonnation, insisting the City was required to initiate formal 
condemnation proceedings and file a Complaint in condemnation or grant the application 
to relocate. Id. 6-7 (§ B Statement of Facts). The City did not agree that this was 
required, but filed the action. Id. 6-7 (§§ B-C Statement of Facts). Several years Yater an 
affiliate of Reagan purchased the property on which the billboard stands and entered into 
a new long term lease with. Reagan. Id. 10-11 (§ G Statement of Facts). Now that 
Reagan no longer needed to relocate the billboard because of an expiring lease, it moved 
the court to dismiss the action because the City had not complied with the pre-filing 
_;equirements, including preparing an appraisal and entering into good faith negotiations. 
with Reag~n based on that @ppraisal. Id. 12-13 (§ I Statement of Facts). The district 
court dismissed the case. Id. The City appealed the decision because the City_Js not 
c_eq_uired to initiate condemnation under Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, to deny an 
application to relocate and it is not possible to comply vvith the requirements of the 
condemnation process set forth in Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, and the Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act if a billboa.!_ci mvner does not cooperate in the process. See generally 
Appellant Br. & Reply Br., Salt Lake City v. ROA General Inc. dba Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Appellate Nq. 2015-0608-CA. Oral argument is scheduled Jor September_ 
15,2016. I · 
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termination of CBS 's billboard. Rather, CBS requested the City exercise the discretion it 
is afforded by section 511 and waive its zoning ordinance to permit CBS tb relocate its 
billboard from one location to another location. The City declined. A municipality's 
refusal to permit relocation of a billboard is r1ot the same as a municipality requiring the 
termination of a billboard. When a request for relocation is refused a billboard is free to 
remain at the existing location. 11 The fact that CBS demolished its billboard prior to 
... 
making its request to relocate (because the landlord had evicted CBS from the land) does t1 ~, 
not transform CBS's request to relocate a billboard under section 511 into the City· 
requiring termination of the billboard under section 512. 
vii. The City Council's role in appropriating funds does not si10w 
the City Council is required to approve the Mayor's decision 
to deny CBS 's application. 
The City Council's role in appropriating funds does not show the City Council is 
required to approve the Mayor's decision to deny CBS 's application. A decision to 
enforce or not enforce a zoning ordinance is classic executive function. See supra § II, 
A. l. That function is not removed because the decision results in the expenditure of 
funds. City Council does not weigh in on every City decision that results in the 
expenditure of funds. Rather, City Council appropriates funds and adopts a budget. See 
generally Utah Code§ 10-9a-203. The executive branch manages the funds appropriated 
and makes decisions based on the funds appropriated or what Council will allocate in a 
11 Sections 511 and 513 do not contemplate a municipality demolishing and 
taking possession of the billboard the billboard owner wishes to relocate. Utah Code §§ 
10-9a-511 & 513. Thus, it is the billboard owner's option to either remain at the existing 
location or elect to demolish its billboard and receive just compensation for the 
municipality's refusal to waive ordinances and permit relocation. 
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requested budget amendment. See generally Utah Code § 10-9a-202. Notably, there is 
no evidence in the record to show that funds were not appropriated or available to pay 
any' amount that may become due as a result of the City's denial of CBS 's application. 
~ The Mayor had authority to deny CB S's ap~lication without the approval of Council. 
\ 
In addition, denying a section 511 application does not necessarily result in an 
) 
obligation to pay funds. Whether the billb_??rd fits the narrmv categories of billboards for 
~'hich compensation is owed may be th,e s1ject of dispute and hotly contested. 12 
Likewise, even if a billboard owner can show entitlement to payment of just 
@ compensation under the statute, the owner may choose to keep its billboard at its current 
location and not. enforce that right or elect to bank billboard credits in lieu of just 
compensation. 13 See supra 6-7, § A, Statement of Facts. It is impractical and 
inconsistent with the roles of the City's branches of government, which place the 
responsibility of enforcing ordinances, approving permits, and managing litigation 
squarely in the realm of the administration, to require the City Council to pass on every 
permit request because there is a possibility that a municipally may incur_ an obligation to 
pay some as yet unknown amount at some unknown time in the future. 
12 For example, in this case CBS has brought to the attention of the City through 
its appeals of this matter that its novv demolished billboard stood at a height of 86 feet, 
rather than the permitted 85 feet, which may absolve the City of any obligation to pay 
just compensation for denying its section 511 application. See Utah Code § 10-9a-
5 l 3(3 )(a)-( d) and 513(2)(c). 
13 S ee supra n.11. 
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B. Section 21A.46.160(CC) does not Preclude the Denial of CBS's 
Application. 
CBS claims, in the alternative, that the denial of its application is illegal because 
section 21A.46.160(CC) of the Salt Lake City Code precludes the City from denying its 
application. "It is well established that, where a city ordinance is in conflict with a state 
statute, the ordinance is invalid at its inception.'' Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, ~ 15, 116 
P.3d 290,293. -See also Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671,674 (1938) ("It is our view 
that the ... [ state statute] makes void all ordinances, otherwise lawful, which conflict 
with and constitute a barrier to the enforcement of the uniform state law."). "In 
determining whether an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether 
the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice 
versa." Hansen, 2005 UT 29, 115 (quoting Kusse, 93 P.2d at 674)). The plain language 
of section 511 allows a municipality to waive ( or not waive) provisions of its zoning 
ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard. Interpreting section 21A.46.160(CC) as 
precluding the City from waiving its ordinances under section 511, unless just 
compensation is owed for the denial, reads section 21A.46.160(CC) in conflict with the--...........__ 
plain language of section 511 that expressly permits a municipality to do that very thing. 
In addition, when interpreting the meaning of an ordinance a court looks first to 
\... 
the plain language of the ordinance and applies the same rules of statutory construction it 
applies when examining a statute. See e.g., Carrier, 2004 UT 98, i130. If the language is 
, ambiguous, courts may resort to other modes of construction. Id., 1 3J. "In so doing, 
however, [courts] must keep in mind that ' [ w ]hen interpreting a[ n ordinance], ii is 
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axiomatic that this court's primary goal 'is to give effect to the [City's] intent in light of 
the purpose that the [ordinance] was meant to achie~e."' Id., ( quoting Biddle v. 
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ~ 14, 993 P.2d 875 (quoting Evans v. Utah, 963 
~ P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998)). Likewise, some deference is afforded the City's 
interpretation of its ordinance. Id., ~ 28. "[I]n close cases [the agency's] interpretation 
may be a determinative factor in choosing a particular interpretation over another." Id., 
31. 
Section 21A.46.160(CC) of the Salt Lake City Code does not state the City must 
~ grant an application to relocate a billboard, if denial will result in an obligation to pay just 
compensation. It states: "Except as otherwise authorized herein, existing billboards may 
not be relocated except as mandated by the requirements of Utah State law." Salt Lake 
City Code § 21A.46. l 60(CC). If the City Council intended to pass a provision that 
required the granting of all applications to relocate, if denial triggered an obligation to 
pay just compensation, it would have passed a provision that said that. Jt did not. 
/,;c11 
'lit/I 
Section 21A.46.160(CC) must also be read in the context of the purpose of the 
Billboard Ordinance and its placement in that ordinance. The Billboard Ordinance 
establishes a billboard bankihg system, which is the only way a billboard owner may 
relocate a billboard within the Salt Lake City limits under City law. Read in that context, 
it is clear the Council's intent in enacting section 21A.46.160(CC), the final provision of 
the billboard ordinance, was to state that the billboard banking system was the only way a 
@ billboard owner could relocate a billboard within Salt Lake City, unless a provision of 
state law required otherwise. 
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A review of the legislative history makes even clearer that this was the intent of 
the legislature. Section 21 A.46.160( CC) was passed at a time when the billboard 
industry was lobbying for state bills in an attempt to reduce a City's ability to deny 
applications for permits to modify or relocate billboards. 14 See e.g., Utah Code § 72-7-
516 (enacted 2002); R. 0746, SLCC 01716-22, S.B. 53, 2004 Leg., Gen Sess. (Utah 
2001) ( expanding circumstances under which a municipality must pay just compensation 
for the denial of a permit to relocate or otherwise modify a billboard). Section 
21A.46. l 60(CC) is nothing more than a statement by City Council that the City cannot be 
forced to allow relocation (unless mandated by state law) and prevents billboard 
companies from attempting to force the City to grant a relocation request where state law 
gives the City discretion to deny those requests, as CBS is attempting to do in this case. 
Finally, some deference should be afforded the City's interpretation of its own 
ordinance. The City has never interpreted this provision to require the City to grant any 
application to relocate when just compensation is owed for the denial. Indeed, the City 
has denied prior requests for relocation that resulted in an obligation to pay just 
compensation. See e.g., Salt Lake City v. ROA General Inc. dba Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, et al., Appellate Case No. 20150608-CA. Section 21A.46.160(CC) does not 
require the City to grant CB S's application and the City's denial of that application was 
not illegal. 
14 Section 21A.46.160(CC) was passed in 2004. (R. 0746, SLCC 01726 & 1731.) 
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C. The City's Denial of CBS's Application is Supported by Substantial 
Evidence. 
The City's denial of CBS's application is not arbitrary and capricious because 
there is substantial evidence to show denying the application furthered the City's goal of 
reducing the number of billboards within City limits. A decision is arbitrary and 
capricious if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Carlsen, 
~ 2012 UT App 260 ri 4. In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a 
decision '"[i]t is not [the] prerogative [ of the court] to weigh the evidence anew." Id., ~ 5 
( quoting Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P .2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)). Rather, the court "must simply determine, in light of the evidence before the 
[ decision making body], whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion." 
~ Id. Likewise, given the nature of judicial review of a decision making body's decision 
"[i]t is incumbent upon the party challenging the . . . decision to marshal all of the 
evidence in support thereof and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the . . . decision [is] not supported by substantial 
evidence." Id. A party cannot simply argue facts that support its position and ignore the 
facts that support the administrative decision. Id., ~ 7. 
\ 
The City denied CBS's section 511 application because it furthered the City's goal 
of reducing the total number of billboards within City limits. CBS demolished its 
billboard before it submitted its section 511 application because the land lease had 
expired and the landlord had evicted the billboard from the property. See supra 7-8, § B, 
Statement of Facts. Thus, denial of the request to relocate the billboard results in the 
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reduction of the total number of billboards in the City. CBS contends the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious because the Becker administration did not have a policy, practice 
or goal of reducing the number of billboards within City limits and a policy, practice or 
goal of an administration must be in writing and enacted by the City Council to be valid. 
First, CBS has completely failed to satisfy its burden and marshal the evidence 
that supports a finding that the Becker administration had a policy, practice or goal of 
retiring billboards. Instead, CBS simply argues no such policy exists. 
Second, a proper marshalling of the evidence reveals that the record is replete with 
documents that illustrate the City's policy, practice, and goal of reducing billboards in the 
City limits. These documents i~clude (1) the City's Billboard Ordinance; 15 (2) the 2011 
proposal by the Becker administration to amend the Billboard Ordinance; 16 (3) Mayor 
15 The City's Billboard Ordinance states its purpose is to limit the number of 
billboards to the current number. Salt Lake City Code § 2 lA.46~ 160(A). It also sets up a 
process for "banking" billboard credits in certain circumstances. Salt Lake City Code §§ 
21A.46.160(D)-(H). The billboard banking system permits a billboard owner to "bank 
credits" if the billboard owner demolishes a billboard that is located in a "gateway" ( or 
other restricted area). Salt Lake City Code §§ 21A.46. l 60(D)-(H). Billboard credits may 
be used to construct a new billboard in a non-gateway area, if they are used within three 
years of the date of creation. Salt Lake City Code§§ 21A.46.160(G)&(N). The billboard 
banking system has the effect of reducing the number of billboards in "gateways." It also 
has the effect of reducing the total number of billboards in the City because a billboard 
owner is not always able to find a new location and redeem the credits before they expire. 
16 In 2011 the Becker administration proposed an amendment to the City's 
Billboard Ordinance to amend the "purpose statement" to read as follows: "This chapter 
is intended to limit and reduce the maximum number of billboards in Salt Lake City." 
(R. 0746, SLCC 001572-77.) That amendment was proposed to "update current 
regulations for outdoor billboards to make them consistent with State law." (R. 0746, 
SLCC 001572-73 ). That amendment was not passed because the billboard ordinance 
revisions also included revisions to the City's electronic billboard restrictions and the 
City Council declined to consider the changes. 
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Becker's 2013 State of the City address; 17 (4) the Declaration of Mayor Becker; 18 (5) the 
City's history of denying other applications to relocate billboards and electing to pay just 
compensation for that denial; 19 and (6) agreements the City has entered into with property 
owners to limit the ability to place billboards on their properties.20 The hearing officer 
and the district court considered this evidence and found that there was substantial 
evidence to show the Becker administration had a long-standing policy, practice or goal 
of reducing the number of billboards within City limits. 
Third, a policy, practice or goal of an administration does not need to be in writing 
~ and enacted by the City Council to be valid. In its letter denying CBS 's application, the 
City stated it was not willing to waive its ordinances and permit the relocation because 
"the City has a long standing policy in favor of retiring and removing billboards." (R. 
0746, 01542.) CBS myopically focuses on the City's use of the word "policy" and 
claims that there is no "policy" of reducing billboards in the City limits because the 
17 In Mayor Becker's 2013 State of the City address, Mayor Becker repeated his 
administration's policy and practice of reducing the number of billboards. (R. 07 46, 
SLCC 001539, ~ 7). 
18 Mayor Becker submitted a declaration referencing the "City's longstanding 
policy to reduce the total number of billboards within the City" and stated that the 
decisions on the applications CBS appeals were made pursuant to that policy. (R. 07 46, 
SLCC 001539, ~ 7). It is well-known that the Becker administration was consistently in 
favor of reducing the number of billboards in the City and CBS received ample evidence 
of the Becker administration putting that position into practice by denying billboard 
relocation applications on gateway streets whenever the opportunity to do so arose. (R. 
0746, SLCC 001568-69). 
19 The City has a history of denying applications to relocate and retiring billboards 
when the opportunity arises, even when it results in protracted litigation. See e.g., Salt 
Lake City v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, et. al. District Court Case No. 100910552, 
Appellate Case No. 2015-0608-CA. 
20 The City has entered into agreements with property owners to limit the ability 
to place billboards on that property in the future. (R. 0746, SLCC 001589-1622). 
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administration does not have authority to make policy. In its ordinary use, and the use 
intended by counsel when writing this letter, the word "policy" includes common 
practices and stated objectives and goals of an administration. Clearly, the 
administration, as the executive branch of the municipal government, has the authority to 
set forth its objectives and goals for the City and direct the executive and administrative 
departments of the City to act to further that vision. See e.g., Utah Code § 10-3b-
202(l)(b) (stating the administration "exercises the executive and administrative powers 
and performs or supervises the performance of the executive and administrative duties 
and functions of the municipality"); Utah Code § 10-3b-202( 1 )( d)(v) (stating the 
administration may "exercise control of and supervise each executive or administrative 
department, division, or officer of the municipality"). For example, decreasing 
homelessness, improving public transportation, rejuvenating downtown, and improving 
walkability and bikeability are all administrative policies, objectives and goals. These 
policies, objectives and goals instruct the decisions and actions of an administration and 
its departments and formal legislation passed by Council is not required to legitimize 
those policies, objectives and goals. In this case, the Becker administration had a 
consistent policy, objective and goal to reduce the number of billboards in the City, and 
the administration acted to further that goal when it denied CBS' s section 511 
application. 
Finally, the Court should disregard CBS_'s claim that the Becker administration's 
policy, practice, or goal of reducing billboards in the City limits was contrary to the 
City's Billboard Ordinance. A "cap and replace" system is not inconsistent with reducing 
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the number of billboards in the City limits and the billboard banking system established 
by the Billboard Ordinance operates in practice to reduce the number of billboards in the 
City limits. See supra n.15. Likewise, there are myriad reasons the 2011 amendments to 
~ the Billboard Ordinance were not adopted, which are outside the scope of the record of 
this case. Regardless, the City Council's failure to adopt the amended ordinance does not 
show the Becker administration had no policy, practice, or goal of reducing the number 
of billboards in the City limits and does not show the Mayor could not act to further that 
goal where the law gave him authority to do so, as it does in this case. The decision to 
~ deny CBS' s section 511 application to further the City's goal of reducing the number of 
billboards in the City limits was not arbitrary and capricious. 
III. THE CITY'S APPROVAL OF CORNER PROPERTY'S APPLICATION 
WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
A. The City Can Waive its Ordinances to Permit Relocation of Corner 
Property's Billboard. 
CBS does not dispute the Mayor has authority to approve Comer Property's 
section 511 application, but contends the approval was illegal because section 511 does 
not permit a City to waive ordinances that regulate the height of billboards. The rules of 
statutory construction previously discussed also apply here. See supra § II, A.2.i-v 
( directing courts to look to the plain language of statutes and not to construe statutes to 
give rise to absurd results.) 
As established by the briefing in this matter, section 511 allows a City to waive ( or 
not waive) its zoning ordinances to permit relocation of a billboard. It is apparent from 
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the plain language of section 511 that section 511 does not limit relocation applications to 
requests for relocation within a certain distance, relocation of billboards of a certain 
height, or relocation of a billboard with the same square footage or the same number of 
faces. Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c). Rather, a billboard owner may submit an 
application pursuant to section 511 that requests any relocation it desires. Utah Code 
§ 10-9a-511 (3 )( c ). This does not mean that the municipality will agree to waive its 
ordinances and grant that application, but no form of application is specifically precluded. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, section 511 necessarily must contemplate waiver 
of ordinances relating to the height of the relocated billboard. Section 511 allows the 
City to waive its zoning ordinance to permit relocation of a billboard to a "mutually 
acceptable" location. Relocation is not going to be "mutually acceptable" if the billboard 
is not visible at the new location. In this case, the proposed relocation was to the site of 
CBS's now demolished billboard. In 2003, CBS's predecessor successfully argued that 
the height of any billboard at that location needs to be 85 feet to be visible.21 Indeed, 
before pursuing relocation of its billboard under section 511, CBS submitted an 
application un~er Utah Code § 72-7-510.5 and attempted to persuade the court that a 
billboard at this location needed to be 116 feet tall to be visible. (R. 0746, SLCC 001428-
21 Specifically, in April, 2003, the prior owner of CBS 's billboard applied for and 
received .permission from the City under a different provision of Utah Code to raise the 
height of the billboard at that location. (R. 0746, SLCC 001422-26). The provision of 
the code the prior owner applied under permits a billboard owner to raise the height of a 
billboard if the "view and readability" is obstructed by certain improvements to an 
interstate highway. Utah Code § 72-7-510.5. CBS's predecessor was granted a permit 
and allowed to increase the height of its billboard to 85 feet because the new highway 
walls obstructed the "view and readability" of the billboard. 
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31 ). 22 Because a billboard needs to stand at 85 feet to be visible at the 726 West South 
Temple location, the City waived its ordinances that would limit the billboard to 60 feet. 
It is absurd for CBS to argue that the City's approval of Comer Property's application is 
@ illegal because the City cannot waive its ordinances to allow the billboard to stand at the 
same height as previous billboard companies argued was necessary to be visible at that 
location. 
Finally, it was not illegal for the City to grant Corner Property a permit to 
construct a billboard with two faces because Comer Property's 500 South billboard had 
<@ two faces. 23 CBS has not shown the City's approval of Corner Property's section 511 
application violated any law, statute or ordinance and the decision was not illegal. 
22 That application was denied because CBS was attempting to both move the 
billboard and raise the height, which is not permitted by that provision of the code. (R. 
0746, SLCC 001433-36). Notably, CBS argued to the district court that this prior attempt 
to move and raise its billboard showed the City may not waive zoning requirements 
relating to height in an application to relocate a billboard. Unlike section 511, Utah Code 
§ 72-7-510.5 provides two distinct options to restore the view and readability of a 
billboard that is obstructed by UDOT improvements: one, move the billboard within 500 
feet of its original location or two, raise the height of the billboard in its current location. 
Utah Code § 72-7-510.5. In contrast, section 511 does not identify specific options 
available to a billboard owner or the City with respect to relocation of a billboard under 
section 511. Rather, section 511 contemplates a negotiation and a waiver of zoning 
ordinances to permit relocation to a "mutually acceptable" location. Utah Code § 10-9a-
5 l 1 (3 )( c )(i). Perhaps conceding that this reference is unhelpful, as the City argued to the 
district court, CBS does not raise this point in this appeal. 
23 CBS's assertion relies on the claim that the 500 South billboard "has been 
pennitted by the City and by UDOT for only one face." (Appellant Br. 27.) As the City 
explained to the hearing officer, the City was unable to locate a copy of the original 
permit issued by the City because the permit was issued at least two decades ago. 
(R. 07 46, SLCC 001415.) However, location of the permit is of little assistance because 
prior to April 12, 1995, billboards were regulated by location and separation 
requirements, not by a "billboard banking" method that keeps track of the number of 
billboards and number of faces. (R. 0746, SLCC 001415.) Thus, Comer Property's 
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B. The City's Approval of Corner Property's Application is Supported by 
Substantial Evidence. 
The approval of Corner Property's application (and denial of CBS's application) 
was not arbitrary and capricious because those decisions resulted in the removal of a 
billboard from 500 South, a critical "gateway" into the City, and reduced the total number 
of billboards in the City by one. See supra § II, C (showing a decision is not arbitrary or 
capricious if it is supported by substantial evidence). Specifically, the City agreed to 
waive its ordinance and approve Corner Property's application because Corner Property 
entered into a billboard relocation agreement under which Corner Property agreed to 
remove a billboard on 500 South, a critical gateway into the City, if the City granted it a 
permit to construct a billboard at 726 West South Temple. As articulated at the 
December 14, 2015 public hearing by a former employee of Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, notably a party with no property interest in the outcome of this hearing, the 
opportunity to retire Comer Property's 500 South billboard was especially valuable to the 
City because Corner Property owns the property on which its 500 South billboard stands. 
initial permit from the City would not include the number of faces or permitted square 
footage. (R. 0746, SLCC 001415.) Similarly, as explained by Corner Property, UDOT 
only requires permitting for billboards that face the flow of traffic and 500 South is a one 
way street. (R. 0746, SLCC 001415, 001421 & 001829-30.) 
Moreover, apparent "illegality" or lack of proper permitting of a billboard does not 
preclude relocation of a billboard. The. billboard industry lobbied the legislature· for 
statutory provisions that would require the payment of just compensation under sect.ion 
513 in circumstances where a billboard was not properly permitted or was othenvise 
"illegal." See e.g., Utah Code § 10-9a-513(a)-(d) (excusing requirement to pay just 
compensation under section 513(2) only where it can be shown by "clear and convincing 
evidence" that the applicant made a "false and misleading" statement in the application 
for a permit); Utah Code§ 10-9a-513(2)(c) (same). 
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(R. 07 46~ SLCC 002234, 3 5: 1070-3 7: 1150.) When a billboard owner owns the property 
on which the billboard stands, it is very unlikely the billboard will ever be retired as there 
is no lease that will eventually expire. Id. Moreover, 500 South is a particularly 
@ important gateway street for the City because it provides access into the City from the 
highway. Id. Comer Property's billboard \Vas the only remaining billboard on 500 South 
from 300 West to 700 East. Id. (R. 0746, SLCC 002305.) 
In addition to removing a billboard from 500 South, granting Corner Property's 
application and denying CBS's application resulted in the reduction of the total number 
of billboards in the City limits by one. 
CBS has argued previously that the City could have denied both applications and 
reduced the total number of billboards in the City by two. That is not correct. Removal 
of the 500 South billboard was contingent on granting Comer Property's application to 
move to the 726 West South Temple location. Denial of both applications still results in 
the net reduction of one billboard. The City made the decision that reducing the number 
of billboards on 500 South was more important than reducing the number of billboards on 
I-15. This preference for the removal of billboard from 500 South does not need to be in 
writing and enacted by the City Council to be a legitimate reason to grant Corner 
Property's application over CBS's application. 24 See supra 36-37, § II, C. 
Unlike Corner Property, CBS offered no inducement for the City to exercise its 
discretion to waive its ordinance with respect to CBS's application. To the contrary, CBS 
24 CBS is well aware that beautifying 500 South and 600 South, which includes 
relocation of billboards away from those gateways streets, is an ongoing discussion in the 
City and Salt Lake County that is referred to as the "Grand Boulevard" project. 
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had already demolished the billboard it now seeks to relocate because the land lease 
expired and the property owner evicted CBS from the property. Indeed, such a 
circumstance presents exactly the opposite incentive, since it provides an opportunity for 
the City to retire a billboard at a relatively low cost to the City. 
Curiously, CBS argues that the City's approval of Comer Property's application 
was arbitrary and capricious because Corner Property's billboard remains on 500 South. 
(Appellant Br. 29, n.2.) Simply driving down 500 South confirms that statement is 
incorrect. 
The City's approval of Corner Property's application (and the denial of CBS's 
application) was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the City's decisions to deny CBS 's application and to 
approve Corner Property's application because those decisions do not violate any law, 
statute or ordinance and are not illegal. Likewise, CBS has not marshaled the evidence 
that supports the City's decisions and that evidence shows the City's decisions were 
supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary and capricious. Finally, even if 
this Court found the approval of City Council was necessary to deny CB S's application, 
CBS's remedy is a remand of that decision for the City to obtain that approval, not a 
decision granting CBS a permit and revoking Corner Property's permit, as CBS requests. 
y\-
DATED this ti_ day of August, 2016. 
44 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief, submitted under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24( f)( 1 ), complies 
with the type-volume limitation. The word processing system used to prepare this brief 
states that it contains 13,518 words and 1,158 lines in Times New Roman type, which is a 
proportionally spaced font. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
@ I hereby certify that on the lS"-f{1 day of August, 2016, a true and correct copy of 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION was served via U.S. 
Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
HB_ATTY-#54485 
Leslie Van Frank, leslie@.cohnekinghorn.com 
Bradley M. Strassberg, bstrassberg(a)cohnekinghorn.com 
COHNE KINGHORN, P.C. 
th 
111 East Broadway, 11 Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jon H. Rogers, rogersconsumerlaw@gmail.com 
825 North 300 West, Suite Nl44 
Northgate Business Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
45 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(j Appellee's Addendum 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 10-9a-511. Nonconforming uses and noncomplying structures, UT ST§ 10-9a-511 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use. Development. and Management Act {Refs & Annos) 
Part 5. Land Use Ordinances 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-511 
§ 10-9a-511. Nonconforming uses and noncomplying structures 
Currentness 
(I )(a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or noncomplying structure may be continued by the 
present or a future property owner. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, provided no structural alteration of the building 
is proposed or made for the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this Subsection (I), the addition of a solar energy device to a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming 
uses upon the terms and conditions set forth in the land use ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by providing a formula establishing a reasonable 
time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the nonconforming use, 
if any; and 
(c) the termination of a nonconforming use due to its abandonment. 
(3)(a) A municipality may not prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a noncomplying structure or terminate the 
nonconforming use of a structure that is involuntarily destroyed in whole or in part due to fire or other calamity unless 
the structure or use has been abandoned. 
(b) A municipality may prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a noncomplying structure or terminate the 
nonconforming use of a structure if: 
(i) the structure is allowed to deteriorate to a condition that the structure is rendered uninhabitable and is not 
repaired or restored within six months after written notice to the property owner that the structure is uninhabitable 
and that the noncomplying structure or nonconforming use will be lost if the structure is not repaired or restored 
within six months; or 
\":''._ '-: 1 ,:: •. • @ 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 10-9a-511. Nonconforming uses and noncomplying structures, UT ST § 10-9a-511 
(ii) the property owner has voluntarily demolished a majority of the noncomplying structure or the building that 
houses the nonconforming use. 
(c)(i) Notwithstanding a prohibition in its zoning ordinance, a municipality may permit a billboard owner to relocate 
the billboard within the municipality's boundaries to a location that is mutually acceptable to the municipality and 
the billboard owner. 
(ii) If the municipality and billboard owner cannot agree to a mutually acceptable location within 90 days after the 
owner submits a written request to relocate the billboard, the provisions of Subsection I 0-9a-5 l 3(2)(a)(iv) apply. 
(4)(a) Unless the municipality establishes, by ordinance, a uniform presumption of legal existence for nonconforming 
uses, the property owner shall have the burden of establishing the legal existence of a noncomplying structure or 
nonconforming use. 
Qj) (b) Any party claiming that a nonconforming use has been abandoned shall have the burden of establishing the 
abandonment. 
(c) Abandonment may be presumed to have occurred if: 
(i) a majority of the primary structure associated with the nonconforming use has been voluntarily demolished 
without prior written agreement with the municipality regarding an extension of the nonconforming use; 
(ii) the use has been discontinued for a minimum of one year; or 
(iii) the primary structure associated with the nonconforming use remains vacant for a period of one year. 
I.@ (d) The property owner may rebut the presumption of abandonment under Subsection (4)(c), and shall have the burden 
of establishing that any claimed abandonment under Subsection (4)(b) has not in fact occurred. 
(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of a school district or charter school use or structure when 
the property associated with the school district or charter school use or structure ceases to be used for school district or 
charter school purposes for a period established by ordinance. 
Credits 
Laws 2005, c. 254, § 40, eff. May 2. 2005; Laws 2007. c. 171. § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 170, § 1. eff. May 12, 
2009; Laws 2010, c. 394, § I, eff. May 11,2010: Laws 2011, c. 210. § I, eff. May 10, 2011: Laws 2012. c. 289. § 4. eff. May 
8. 2012; Laws 2015. c. 205. § l. eff. May 12. 2015. 
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• § 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent..., UT ST§ 10-9a-513 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use, Development. and Management Act {Refs & Annos) 
Part 5. Land Use Ordinances 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-513 
§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent domain--Removal 
without providing compensation--Limit on allowing nonconforming billboards to 
be rebuilt or replaced--Validity of municipal permit after issuance of state permit 
Currentness 
(I) As used in this section: 
(a) "Clearly visible" means capable of being read without obstruction by an occupant of a vehicle traveling on a street 
or highway within the visibility area. 
(b) "Highest allowable height" means: 
(i) if the height allowed by the municipality, by ordinance or consent, is higher than the height under Subsection 
(l)(b)(ii), the height allowed by the municipality; or 
(ii)(A) for a noninterstate billboard: 
(I) if the height of the previous use or structure is 45 feet or higher, the height of the previous use or structure; or 
{II) if the height of the previous use or structure is less than 45 feet, the height of the previous use or structure 
or the height to make the entire advertising content of the billboard clearly visible, whichever is higher, but 
no higher than 45 feet; and 
(B) for an interstate billboard: 
(I) if the height of the previous use or structure is at or above the interstate height, the height of the previous 
use or structure; or 
(II) if the height of the previous use or structure is less than the interstate height, the height of the previous use 
or structure or the height to make the entire advertising content of the billboard clearly visible, whichever is 
higher, but no higher than the interstate height. 
(c) "Interstate billboard" means a billboard that is intended to be viewed from a highway that is an interstate. 
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent ... , UT ST§ 10-9a-513 
(d) "Interstate height" means a height that is the higher of: 
(i) 65 feet above the ground; and 
(ii) 25 feet above the grade of the interstate. 
(e) "Noninterstate billboard" means a billboard that is intended to be viewed from a street or highway that is not 
an interstate. 
(f) "Visibility area" means the area on a street or highway that is: 
(i) defined at one end by a line extending from the base of the billboard across all Janes of traffic of the street or 
highway in a plane that is perpendicular to the street or highway; and 
(ii) defined on the other end by a line extending across all lanes of traffic of the street or highway in a plane that is: 
(A) perpendicular to the street or highway; and 
(B)(I) for an interstate billboard, 500 feet from the base of the billboard; or 
(II) for a noninterstate billboard, 300 feet from the base of the billboard. 
(2)(a) A municipality is considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent domain if the 
municipality prevents a billboard owner from: 
(i) rebuilding, maintaining, repairing, or restoring a billboard structure that is damaged by casualty, an act of God, ~ 
or vandalism; 
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), relocating or rebuilding a billboard structure, or taking other measures, 
to correct a mistake in the placement or erection of a billboard for which the municipality has issued a permit, if the 
proposed relocation, rebuilding, or other measure is consistent with the intent of that permit; 
(iii) structura11y modifying or upgrading a billboard; 
(iv) relocating a billboard into any commercial, industrial, or manufacturing zone within the municipality's 
boundaries, if: 
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i) § 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent..., UT ST§ 10-9a-513 
(A) the relocated billboard is: 
(I) within 5,280 feet of its previous location; and 
(II) no closer than: 
(Aa) 300 feet from an off-premise sign existing on the same side of the street or highway; or 
(Bb) if the street or highway is an interstate or limited access highway that is subject to Title 72, Chapter 7, 
Part 5, Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, the distance allowed under that act between the relocated bi11board 
and an off-premise sign existing on the same side of the interstate or limited access highway; and 
(B)(I) the bi11board owner has submitted a written request under Subsection 10-9a-5l 1(3)(c); and 
(II) the municipality and billboard owner are unable to agree, within the time provided in Subsection 
10-9a-511 (3)(c), to a mutual1y acceptable location; or 
(v) making the following modifications, as the billboard owner determines, to a billboard that is structurally 
modified or upgraded under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) or relocated under Subsection (2)(a)(iv): 
(A) erecting the billboard: 
(I) to the highest allowable height; and 
(II) as the owner determines, to an angle that makes the entire advertising content of the billboard clearly 
visible; and 
(B) installing a sign face on the billboard that is at least the same size as, but no larger than, the sign face on the 
billboard before its relocation. 
(b) A modification under Subsection (2)(a)(v) shall comply with Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5, Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act, to the extent applicable. 
(c) A municipality's denial of a billboard owner's request to relocate or rebuild a billboard structure, or to take other 
measures, in order to correct a mistake in the placement or erection of a billboard does not constitute the initiation 
of acquisition by eminent domain under Subsection (2)(a) if the mistake in placement or erection of the billboard is 
determined by clear and convincing evidence to have resulted from an intentionally false or misleading statement: 
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent. .. , UT ST§ 10-9a-513 
(i) by the billboard applicant in the application; and 
(ii) regarding the placement or erection of the billboard. 
(d) If a municipality is considered to have initiated the acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent domain under 
Subsection (2)(a) orany other provision ofapplicable law, the municipality shall pay just compensation to the billboard 
owner in an amount that is: 
(i) the value of the existing billboard at a fair market capitalization rate, based on actual annual revenue, less any 
annual rent expense; 
(ii) the value of any other right associated with the billboard structure that is acquired; 
(iii) the cost of the sign structure; and 
(iv) damage to the economic unit described in Subsection 72-7-510(3 )(b ), of which the billboard owner's interest 
is a part. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) and Section l0-9a-512, a municipality may remove a billboard without providing 
compensation if: 
(a) the municipality determines: 
(i) by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading statement 
in the applicant's application regarding the placement or erection of the billboard; or 
(ii) by substantial evidence that the billboard: 
(A) is structurally unsafe; 
(B) is in an unreasonable state of repair; or 
(C) has been abandoned for at least 12 months; 
(b) the municipality notifies the owner in writing that the owner's billboard meets one or more of the conditions listed 
in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(c) the owner fails to remedy the condition or conditions within: 
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§ 10-9a-513. Municipality's acquisition of billboard by eminent..., UT ST § 10-9a-513 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (3){c)(ii), 90 days following the billboard owner's receipt of written notice under 
Subsection (3)(b); or 
(ii) if the condition forming the basis of the municipality's intention to remove the billboard is that it is structurally 
unsafe, 10 business days, or a longer period if necessary because of a natural disaster, following the billboard owner's 
receipt of written notice under Subsection (3)(b); and 
(d) following the expiration of the applicable period under Subsection (3 )(c) and after providing the owner with 
reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the municipality finds: 
(i) by clear and convincing evidence, that the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading 
statement in the application regarding the placement or erection of the billboard; or 
(ii) by substantial evidence that the billboard is structurally unsafe, is in an unreasonable state of repair, or has been 
abandoned for at least 12 months. 
(4) A municipality may not allow a nonconforming billboard to be rebuilt or replaced by anyone other than its owner 
or the owner acting through its contractors. 
(5) A pem1it issued. extended. or renewed by a municipality for a billboard remains valid from the time the municipality 
issues, extends, or rene\vs the permit until 180 days after a required state permit is issued for the billboard if: 
(a) the bil1board requires a state permit; and 
(b) an application for the state permit is filed within 30 days after the municipality issues, extends, or renews a permit 
for the billboard. 
Credits 
Laws 2005. c. 254, § 42, eff. May 2, 2005: Laws 2007. c. 171. § 2, eff. April 30. 2007: Laws 2009. c. 170. § 2, eff. May 12. 
2009; Laws 2009. c. 233. § 1. eff. Mav 12, 2009. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-513, UT ST§ 10-9a-5 l 3 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
End of Document ( 2ti 16 Thnmsl)O Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
,,: ; 
·. © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain r ors.
§ 10-9a-7O1. Appeal authority required--Condition precedent to ... , UT ST§ 10-9a-701 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use. Development. and Management Act {Refs & Annos) 
Part 7. Appeal Authority and Variances 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-701 
§ 10-9a-701. Appeal authority required--Condition precedent to judicial review--Appeal authority duties 
Currentness 
( 1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one or more appeal authorities to 
hear and decide: 
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; 
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances; and 
(c) appeals from a fee charged in accordance with Section l0-9a-510. 
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall timely and specifically challenge a ~ 
land use authority's decision, in accordance with local ordinance. 
(3) An appeal authority: 
(a) shall: 
(i) act in a quasi-judicial manner; and 
(ii) serve as the final arbiter of issues involving the interpretation or application of land use ordinances; and 
(b) may not entertain an appeal of a matter in which the appeal authority, or any participating member, had first 
acted as the land use authority. 
(4) By ordinance, a municipality may: 
(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than the appeal authority it designates to hear ~ 
appeals; 
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@ § 10-9a-701. Appeal authority required--Condition precedent to ... , UT ST§ 10-9a-701 
(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types of appeals of land use authority decisions; 
(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district 
court; 
(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive appeals before the same or separate appeal 
authorities as a condition of the adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative remedies; and 
(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed directly to the district court. 
(5) If the municipality establishes or, prior to the effective date of this chapter, has established a multiperson board, 
body, or panel to act as an appeal authority, at a minimum the board, body, or panel shall: 
(a) notify each of its members of any meeting or hearing of the board, body, or panel; 
(b) provide each of its members with the same information and access to municipal resources as any other member; 
(c) convene only if a quorum of its members is present; and 
(d) act only upon the vote of a majority of its convened members. 
Credits 
~ Laws 2005. c. 254, § 61, eff. May 2, 2005;_ Laws 2011. c. 92. § 4, eff. Mav 10.2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-701, UT ST§ 10-9a-701 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
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§ 10-9a-707. Standard of review for appeals, UT ST§ 10-9a-707 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter gA. Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 7. Appeal Authority and Variances 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-707 
§ 10-9a-707. Standard of review for appeals 
Currentness 
(l) A municipality may, by ordinance, designate the standard of review for appeals of land use authority decisions. 
(2) If the municipality fails to designate a standard of review of factual matters, the appeal authority shall review the 
matter de novo. 
(3) The appeal authority shall determine the correctness of a decision of the land use authority in its interpretation and 
application of a land use ordinance. 
(4) Only those decisions in which a land use authority has applied a land use ordinance to a particular application, person, 
or parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority. 
Credits 
Laws 2005. c. 254. § 67, eff. May 2, 2005. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-9a-707, UT ST§ 10-9a-707 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
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Chapter 21A.16 
APPEALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
This section has been affected by a recently passed ordinance, 10-2016 - LAND USE 
PROVISIONS . Go to new ordinance. 
21A.16.010: AUTHORITY: 
As described in section 21A.06.040 of this title, the appeals hearing officer shall hear and 
~ decide appeals alleging an error in any administrative decision made by the zoning 
administrator or the administrative hearing officer in the administration or enforcement of this 
title, as well as administrative decisions of the historic landmark commission; and the 
planning commission. 
<;j In addition, the appeals hearing officer shall hear and decide applications for variances as 
per chapter 21A.18 of this title. (Ord. 61-12, 2012) 
@ 21A.16.020: PARTIES ENTITLED TO APPEAL: 
An applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision administering or 
interpreting this title may appeal to the appeals hearing officer. (Ord. 31-12, 2012) 
This section has been affected by a recently passed ordinance, 10-2016 - LAND USE 
PROVISIONS . Go to new ordinance. 
21A.16.030: PROCEDURE: 
Appeals of administrative decisions by the zoning administrator, historic landmark 
commission or planning c.ommission to the appeals hearing officer shall be taken in 
accordance with the following procedures: 
A. Filing Of Appeal: An appeal shall be made in writing within ten (10) days of the 
administrative decision by the zoning administrator, historic landmark commission or 
planning commission and shall be filed with the zoning administrator. The appeal shall 
specify the decision appealed, the alleged error made in connection with the decision 
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being appealed, and the reasons the appellant claims the decision to be in error. 
including every theory of relief that can be presented in district court. 
B. Fees: The application shall be accompanied by the applicable fees shown on the Salt 
Lake City consolidated fee schedule. The applicant shall also be responsible for payment 
of all fees established for providing the public notice required by chapter 21A.10 of this 
title. 
C. Stay Of Proceedings: An appeal to the appeals hearing officer shall stay all further 
proceedings concerning the matter about which the appealed order, requirement. 
decision, determination, or interpretation was made unless the zoning administrator 
certifies in writing to the appeals hearing officer, after the appeal has been filed, that a 
stay would, in the zoning administrator's opinion. be against the best interest of the city. 
D. Notice Required: 
1. Public Hearing: Upon receipt of an appeal of an administrative decision by the zoning 
administrator, the appeals hearing officer shall schedule and hold a public hearing in 
accordance with the standards and procedures for conduct of the public hearing set 
forth in chapter 21A.10 of this title. 
2. Notice Of Appeals Of Administrative Decisions Of The Historic Landmark Commission 
Or Planning Commission: Appeals from a decision of the historic landmark commission 
or planning commission are based on evidence in the record. Therefore, testimony at 
the appeal meeting shall be limited to the appellant and the respondent. 
a. Upon receipt of an appeal of a decision by the historic landmark commission or 
planning commission the appeals hearing officer shall schedule a public meeting to 
hear arguments by the appellant and respondent. Notification of the date, time and 
place of the meeting shall be given to the appellant and respondent a minimum of 
twelve (12) calendar days in advance of the meeting. 
b. The city shall give e-mail notification, or other form of notification chosen by the 
appeals hearing officer, a minimum of twelve (12) calendar days in advance of the 
hearing to any organization entitled to receive notice pursuant to title 2, chapter 2.60 
of this code. 
E. Standard Of Review: 
1. The standard of review for an appeal, other than as provided in subsection E2 of this ~ 
section, shall be de novo. The appeals hearing officer shall review the matter appealed 
anew. based upon applicable procedures and standards for approval. and shall give no 
deference to the decision below. 
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2. An appeal from a decision of the historic landmark commission or planning 
commission shall be based on the record made below. 
a. No new evidence shall be heard by the appeals hearing officer unless such 
evidence was improperly excluded from consideration below. 
b. The appeals hearing officer shall review the decision based upon applicable 
standards and shall determine its correctness. 
c. The appeals hearing officer shall uphold the decision unless it is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record or it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect 
when the decision was made. 
F. Burden Of Proof: The appellant has the burden of proving the decision appealed is 
incorrect. 
G. Action By The Appeals Hearing Officer: The appeals hearing officer shall render a written 
decision on the appeal. Such decision may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or may 
modify the administrative decision. A decision by the appeals hearing officer shall 
become effective on the date the decision is rendered. 
H. Notification Of Decision: Notification of the decision of the appeals hearing officer shall be 
sent by mail to all parties to the appeal within ten (10) days of the appeals hearing 
officer's decision. 
I. Record Of Proceedings: The proceedings of each appeal hearing shall be recorded on 
audio equipment. The audio recording of each appeal hearing shall be kept for a 
minimum of sixty (60) days. Upon the written request of any interested person, such 
audio recording shall be kept for a reasonable period of time beyond the sixty (60) day 
period, as determined by the appeals hearing officer. Copies of the tapes of such 
hearings may be provided, if requested, at the expense of the requesting party. The 
appeals hearing officer may have the appeal proceedings contemporaneously 
transcribed by a court reporter. 
J. Appeals: Any person adversely affected by a final decision made by the appeals hearing 
officer may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within thirty (30) 
days after the decision is rendered. 
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K. Policies And Procedures: The planning director shall adopt policies and procedures, 
consistent with the provisions of this section, for processing appeals, the conduct of an 
appeal hearing. and for any other purpose considered necessary to properly consider an 
appeal. (Ord. 54-14, 2014: Ord. 58-13, 2013: Ord. 61-12, 2012) i> 
21A.16.040: APPEAL OF DECISION: 
Any person adversely affected by a final decision made by the appeals hearing officer may 
file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within thirty (30) days after the 
decision is rendered. (Ord. 8-12, 2012) 
21A.16.050: STAY OF DECISION: 
The appeals hearing officer may stay the issuance of any permits or approvals based on its 
decision for thirty (30) days or until the decision of the district court in any appeal of the 
decision. (Ord. 8-12, 2012) 
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VJV 
21A.46.160: BILLBOARDS:~ c21 
A. Purpose Statement: This section is intended to limit the maximum number of billboards in Salt 
Lake City to no greater than the current number. This chapter further provides reasonable 
processes and methods for the replacement or relocation of existing nonconforming billboards to 
areas of the city where they will have less negative impact on the goals and policies of the city 
which promote the enhancement of the city's gateways, views, vistas and related urban design 
elements of the city's master plans. 
B. Definitions: The definitions in this section apply in addition to those in section 21A.46.020 of this 
chapter. 
BILLBOARD: A form of an off premises sign. A freestanding ground sign located on industrial, 
commercial or residential property if the sign is designed or intended to direct attention to a 
business, product or service that is not sold, offered or existing on the property where the sign is 
located. 
BILLBOARD BANK: An accounting system established by the city to keep track of the number and 
square footage of nonconforming billboards removed pursuant to this chapter. 
BILLBOARD CREDIT: An entry into a billboard owner's billboard bank account that shows the 
number and square footage of demolished nonconforming billboards. 
BILLBOARD OWNER: The owner of a billboard in Salt Lake City. 
DWELL TIME: The length of time that elapses between text, images, or graphics on an electronic 
billboard or electronic sign. 
ELECTRONIC BILLBOARD: Any off premises sign, video display, projected image, or similar device 
with text, images, or graphics generated by solid state electronic components. Electronic billboards 
include, but are not limited to, billboards that use light emitting diodes (LED), plasma displays, fiber 
optics, or other technology that results in bright, high resolution text, images, and graphics. 
ELECTRONIC SIGN: Any on premises sign, video display, projected image, or similar device with 
text, images, or graphics generated by solid state electronic components. Electronic signs include, 
but are not limited to, signs that use light emitting diodes (LED), plasma displays, fiber optics, or 
other technology that results in bright, high resolution text, images, and graphics. 
EXISTING BILLBOARD: A billboard which was constructed, maintained and in use or for which a 
permit for construction was issued as of July 13, 1993. 
FOOT-CANDLE: The English unit of measurement for luminance, which is equal to one lumen, 
incident upon an area of one square foot. 
'.GATEWAY: The following streets ·or highways within Salt Lake City:: 
:1. Interstate 80; 
2. lnterstate215~ 
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3. Interstate 15; 
4. 4000 West; 
5. 5600 West; 
:6. 2100 South Street frdm Interstate 15 to 1300. East;: 
7. The 2100 South Expressway from 1-15 west fo the city limit;; 
8. Foothill Drive from Guardsman Way to Interstate ao;: 
9. 400 South from Interstate 15 to 800 East; 
10. 500 South from Interstate 15 to 700 East; 
,11. 600 South from Interstate 15 to 700 Ea.st;; 
12. 300 West from 900 North to 900 South~ 
·13. North Temple from Main Street to Interstate 80~ 
14. Main Street from North Temple to 2100 So~th Stre~tj 
15. State Stre.eftrom .. Squth.Teniple to 21Q0 South; ari~ 
!16. aoo· North from ado West Jo 300 West.; 
ILLUMINANCE: The intensity of light falling on a subsurface at a defined distance from the source. 
MOTION: The depiction of movement or change of position of text. images, or graphics. Motion shall 
include, but not be limited to, visual effects such as dissolving and fading text and images. running 
sequential text, graphic bursts, lighting that resembles zooming, twinkling, or sparkling, changes in 
light or color. transitory bursts of light intensity, moving patterns or bands of light, expanding or 
contracting shapes. and similar actions. 
NEW BILLBOARD: A billboard for which a permit to construct is issued after December 31, 1993. 
NONCONFORMING BILLBOARD: An existing billboard which is located in a zoning district or 
otherwise situated in a way which would not be permitted by the provisions of this chapter. 
SPECIAL GATEWAY: The following streets or highways within Salt Lake City: 
1. North Temple between 600 West and 2200 West; 
2. 400 South between 200 East and 800 East; 
3. State Street between 600 South and 2100 South; and 
4. Main Street between 600 South and 2100 South. 
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TEMPORARY EMBELLISHMENT: An extension of the billboard resulting in increased square 
footage as part of an artistic design to convey a specific message or advertisement. 
TWIRL Tl ME: The time it takes for static text, images, and graphics on an electronic billboard or 
electronic sign to change to a different text, images, or graphics on a subsequent sign face. 
C. Limit On The Total Number Of Billboards: No greater number of billboards shall be allowed in Salt 
Lake City than the number of existing billboards. 
D. Permit Required For Removal Of Nonconforming Billboards: 
1. Permit: Nonconforming billboards may be removed by the billboard owner only after obtaining a 
permit for the demolition of the nonconforming billboard. 
2. Application: Application for demolition shall be on a form provided by the zoning administrator. 
3. Fee: The fee for demolishing a nonconforming billboard shall be as shown on the Salt Lake City 
consolidated fee schedule. 
E. Credits For Nonconforming Billboard Removal: After a nonconforming billboard is demolished 
pursuant to a permit issued under subsection 01 of this section, or its successor, the city shall 
create a billboard bank account for the billboard owner. The account shall show the date of the 
removal and the zoning district of the demolished nonconforming billboard. The account shall 
reflect billboard credits for the billboard and its square footage. Demolition of a conforming 
billboard shall not result in any billboard credit. 
F. Priority For Removal Of Nonconforming Billboards: Nonconforming billboards shall be removed 
subject to the following priority schedule: 
1. Billboards in districts zoned residential, historic, residential R-MU or downtown D-1, 0-3 and 0-4 
sh all be removed first; 
2. Billboards in districts zoned commercial CN or CB, or gateway or on gateways shall be removed 
second; 
3. Billboards which are nonconforming for any other reason shall be removed last; and 
4. A billboard owner may demolish nonconforming billboards of a lower priority before removing 
billboards in a higher priority; however, the billboard credits for removing the lower priority billboard 
~ shall not become effective for use in constructing a new billboard until two (2) billboards specified in 
subsection F1 of this section, or its successor, with a total square footage equal to or greater than 
the lower priority billboard, are credited in the billboard owner's billboard bank account. If a billboard 
owner has no subsection F1 of this section, or its successor, nonconforming billboards, two (2) 
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subsection F2 of this section, or its successor, priority billboards may be credited in the billboard 
owner's billboard bank account to effectuate the billboard credits of a subsection F3 of this section, 
or its successor, billboard to allow the construction of a new billboard. For the purposes of this 
section, the two (2) higher priority billboards credited in the billboard bank account can be used only 
once to effectuate the billboard credits for a lower priority billboard. 
G. Life Of Billboard Credits: Any billboard credits not used within thirty six (36) months of their 
creation shall expire and be of no further value or use except that lower priority credits 
effectuated pursuant to subsection F4 of this section, or its successor, shall expire and be of no 
further value or use within sixty (60) months of their initial creation. 
H. Billboard Credits Transferable: A billboard owner may sell or otherwise transfer a billboard and/or 
billboard credits. Transferred billboard credits which are not effective because of the priority 
provisions of subsection F of this section, or its successor, shall not become effective for their 
new owner until they would have become effective for the original owner. The transfer of any 
billboard credits do not extend their thirty six (36) month life provided in subsection G of this 
section, or its successor. 
I. Double Faced Billboards: Demolition of a nonconforming billboard that has two (2) advertising 
faces shall receive billboard credits for the square footage on each face, but only as one 
billboard. 
J. New Billboard Construction: It is unlawful to construct a new billboard other than pursuant to the 
terms of this chapter. In the event of a conflict between this chapter and any other provision in 
this code, the provisions of this chapter shall prevail. 
K. Permitted Zoning Districts: New billboards may be constructed only in the area identified on the 
official billboard map. 
L. New Billboard Permits: 
1. Application: Anyone desiring to construct a new billboard shall file an application on a form provided 
by the zoning administrator. 
2. Fees: The fees for a new billboard construction permit shall be: 
a. Building permit and plan review fees required by the uniform building code as adopted by the city; 
and 
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b. Inspection tag fees as shown on the Salt Lake City consolidated fee schedule. 
M. Use Of Billboard Credits: 
1. A new billboard permit shall only be issued if the applicant has billboard credits of a sufficient 
number of square feet and billboards to allow construction of the new billboard. 
2. When the permit for the construction of a new billboard is issued, the zoning administrator shall 
deduct from the billboard owner's billboard bank account: 
a. The square footage of the new billboard; and 
b. The number of billboards whose square footage was used to allow the new billboard construction. 
3. If the new billboard uses less than the entire available billboard credits considering both the number 
of billboards and square footage, any remaining square footage shall remain in the billboard bank. 
N. New Billboards Prohibited On ·Gateways: Except as provided in'·sub~ection Q_ofthis ~ediop, ·or'it~ 
successor, no new billboard may· be constructed vyithin si.x _h~r,dr~tjJ¢.et'(69C)') of the. ri.ght of w_ay of; 
any gateway. 
0. Special Gateway Provisions: 
1. If a nonconforming billboard is demolished within a special gateway, the billboard owner may 
construct a new billboard along the same special gateway in a zoning district equal to or less 
restrictive than that from which the nonconforming billboard was removed and subject to subsections 
P, Q, Rand S of this section, provided that the size of the new billboard does not exceed the amount 
of billboard credits in the special gateway billboard bank. 
2. The demolition of a nonconforming billboard pursuant to this section shall not accrue billboard credits 
within the general billboard bank. Credits for a billboard demolished or constructed within a special 
gateway shall be tracked within a separate bank account for each special gateway. A permit for the 
construction of a new billboard pursuant to this section must be taken out within thirty six (36) 
months of the demolition of the nonconforming billboard. 
P. Maximum Size: The maximum size of the advertising area of any new billboard shall not exceed 
fifteen feet (15') in height and fifty feet (50') in width. 
Q. Temporary Embellishments: 
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1. Temporary embellishments shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the advertising face of any 
billboard, and shall not exceed five feet (5 1) in height above the billboard structure. 
2. No temporary embellishment shall be maintained on a billboard more than twelve ( 12) months. 
R. Height: The highest poi_nt of any new billboard, excluding temporary embellishments shall not be 
more than: 
1. Forty five feet (45') above the existing grade; or 
2. If a street within one hundred feet (100') of the billboard, measured from the street at the point at 
which the billboard is perpendicular to the street, is on a different grade than the new billboard, 
twenty five feet (25') above the pavement elevation of the street. 
3. If the provisions of subsection R2 of this section, or its successor subsection, apply to more than one 
street, the new billboard may be the higher of the two (2) heights. 
S. Minimum Setback Requirements: All freestanding billboards shall be subject to pole sign setback 
requirements listed for the district in which the billboard is located. In the absence of setback 
standards for a particular district, freestanding billboards shall maintain a setback of not less than 
five feet (5') from the front or corner side lot line. This setback requirement shall be applied to all 
parts of the billboard, not just the sign support structure. 
T. Spacing: 
1. Small Signs: Billboards with an advertising face three hundred (300) square feet or less in size shall 
not be located closer than three hundred (300) linear feet from any other small billboard or eight 
hundred feet (800') from a large billboard on the same side of the street; 
2. Large Signs: Billboards with an advertising face greater than three hundred (300) square feet in size 
shall not be located closer than eight hundred (800) linear feet from any other billboard, small or 
large, on the same side of the street. 
3. Electronic Billboards: Electronic billboards shall not be located closer than one thousand six hundred 
(1,600) linear feet from any other electronic billboard on the same or opposite side of the street. 
U. Electronic Billboards: 
1. Prohibitions: Except as provided in subsection U2 of this section, after the effective date of this 
subsection U: 
a. No electronic billboard shall be constructed or reconstructed for any reason, and 
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b. The conversion, remodeling, or rehabilitation of any existing billboard to an electronic format is 
prohibited. 
2. Standards When Construction/Conversion Required By Law: If after the effective date of this 
subsection U the city is required by law to allow construction of a new electronic billboard, or to allow 
conversion of an existing billboard to an electronic format, any such electronic billboard shall be 
operated pursuant to the following standards: 
a. Any motion of any kind is prohibited on an electronic sign face. Electronic billboards shall have only 
static text, images, and graphics. 
(1) The dwell time of any text. image, or display on an electronic billboard may not exceed more than 
once every eight (8) seconds. Twirl time between subsequent text, images, or display shall not 
~ exceed one-fourth (0.25) second. 
(2) The illumination of any electronic billboard shall not increase the ambient lighting level more than 
three-tenths (0.3) foot-candle when measured by a foot-candle meter perpendicular to the electronic 
billboard face at: 
(A) One hundred fifty feet (150') for an electronic billboard with a surface area of not more than two 
hundred forty two (242) square feet; 
(8) Two hundred feet (200') for an electronic billboard with a surface area greater than two hundred 
forty two (242) square feet but not more than three hundred seventy eight (378) square feet; 
(C) Two hundred fifty feet (250') for an electronic billboard with a surface area greater than three 
hundred seventy eight (378) square feet but not more than six hundred seventy two (672) square 
feet; and 
(D) Three hundred fifty feet (350') for an electronic billboard with a surface area greater than six 
hundred seventy two (672) square feet. 
b. Electronic billboards may not be illuminated or lit between the hours of twelve o'clock (12:00) 
midnight and six o'clock (6:00) A.M. if they are located in, or within six hundred feet (600') of a 
residential, mixed use, downtown, Sugar House business district, gateway, neighborhood 
commercial, community business, or community shopping center zoning district. 
c. Controls shall be provided as follows: 
(1) All electronic billboards shall be equipped with an automatic dimmer control or other mechanism 
that automatically controls the sign's brightness and display period as provided above. 
(2) Prior to approval of any permit to operate an electronic billboard, the applicant shall certify that the 
sign has been tested and complies with the motion, dwell time, brightness, and other requirements 
herein. 
(3) The owner and/or operator of an electronic billboard shall submit an annual report to the city 
certifying that the sign complies with the motion, dwell time, brightness, and other requirements 
herein. 
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V. Landscaping In Residential And Commercial CN And CB Zoning Districts: Properties in any 
residential zone and commercial CN or CB zones on which a billboard is the only structure shall 
be landscaped as required by sections 21A.26.020 and 21A.26.030 and chapter 21A.48 of this 
title, or its successor chapter. No portion of such property shall be hard or gravel surfaced. 
W. Landscaping In Other Zoning Districts: Property in all districts other than as specified in 
subsection V of this section, or its successor subsection, upon which a billboard is the only 
structure, shall be landscaped from the front of the property to the deepest interior point of the 
billboard for fifty (50) linear feet along the street frontage distributed, to the maximum extent 
possible, evenly on each side of the billboard. 
X. Xeriscape Alternative: If all the properties adjacent to and across any street from the property for 
which billboard landscaping is required pursuant to subsection W of this section, or its successor 
subsection, are not developed or, if a water line for irrigation does not exist on the property or in 
the street right of way adjacent to such property, the zoning administrator may authorize 
xeriscaping as an alternative for the required landscaping. 
Y. Existing Billboard Landscaping: Existing billboards shall comply with the landscaping provisions of 
this section on or before January 1, 1996. 
Z. Compliance With Tree Stewardship Ordinance: Construction, demolition or maintenance of 
billboards shall comply with the provisions of the Salt Lake City tree stewardship ordinance. 
AA. Subdivision Registration: To the extent that the lease or other acquisition of land for the site of a 
new billboard may be determined to be a subdivision pursuant to state statute no subdivision plat 
shall be required and the zoning administrator is authorized to approve, make minor subsequent 
amendments to, and record as necessary, such subdivision. 
BB. Special Provisions: 
1. Applicability: The provisions of this section shall apply to specified billboards located: 
a. Four (4) existing billboards between 1500 North and 1800 North adjacent to the west side of 
Interstate 15; and 
b. One existing billboard on the east side of Victory Road at approximately 1100 North. 
2. General Applicability: Except as modified by this section, all other provisions of this chapter shall 
apply to the five (5) specified billboards. 
3. Special Priority: The five (5) specified billboards shall be considered as gateway billboards for the 
purposes of the priority provisions of subsection F of this section, or its successor subsection. 
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4. Landscaping: The five (5) specified billboards shall be landscaped pursuant to the provisions of 
subsection W of this section, or its successor subsection. 
CC. State Mandated Relocation Of Billboards: Except as otherwise authorized herein, existing 
billboards may not be relocated except as mandated by the requirements of Utah state law. (Ord. 
4-12, 2012: Ord. 24-11, 2011) 
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